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Particularly in places with few recognizable gun control laws, “gun neutral”
civil and criminal rules are an important but often-unnoticed basis for the legal
regulation of guns. The burdens that these rules impose on the keeping and bearing of arms are at times significant, but they are also incidental, which raises hard
questions about the boundaries between constitutional law, regulation, and legally
enforceable private ordering. Does the Second Amendment apply to civil suits for
trespass, negligence, and nuisance? Does the Amendment cover gun-neutral laws
of general applicability like assault and disturbing the peace? In the course of addressing these practical questions and the broader conceptual challenges that they
represent, this Article fashions analytic tools that may be useful to a wide range of
constitutional problems.
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INTRODUCTION
The boundaries of the Second Amendment do not coincide
with the boundaries of gun control. The Amendment does not
reach, let alone prohibit,1 all direct burdens imposed by gun control.2 Conversely, it might apply to—and could invalidate—some
incidental burdens imposed by civil suits or other gun-neutral
laws of general applicability.3
District of Columbia v Heller4 makes the first of these propositions clear, holding that certain “longstanding prohibitions”
like bans on possession by felons and the mentally ill fall outside
the scope of the Second Amendment.5 In the wake of Heller,
lower courts have adopted and extended the Court’s analysis to
other well-established types of regulation. With regard to these
categories of regulation, scrutiny is not an issue; the Second
Amendment “just does not show up.”6
The second proposition—that the Second Amendment might
cover gun-neutral laws of general applicability—is not (yet) a
matter of blackletter law but is easy enough to illustrate. Heller

1
The distinction between reaching and prohibiting echoes the distinction between
coverage and protection. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv L Rev 1765, 1769
(2004) (explaining the distinction between coverage and protection in the First Amendment context).
2
See Part II.A.
3
See Part II.B.
4
554 US 570 (2008).
5
Id at 626.
6
Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1769 (cited in note 1) (discussing the First Amendment).
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struck down a safe-storage rule that, with some exceptions, penalized gun owners who failed to keep their guns locked or disassembled when not in use.7 That law directly burdened gun
possession and thus constituted “gun control” in the traditional
sense. But what if the DC courts had held that ordinary negligence law created a duty of care identical to that imposed by the
safe-storage regulation and thus that gun owners were civilly liable for injuries caused by failures to keep their guns locked or
disassembled?8 Or what if the prosecutor’s office brought criminal negligence charges against a gun owner on the same basis?9
The Second Amendment’s relevance to these indirect burdens on guns remains unclear as a matter of doctrine and theory.10 Whether gun-neutral regulations implicate the Second
Amendment raises at least three fundamental inquiries: What
kinds of behavioral constraints are constitutionally significant?11
How does answering—or even entertaining—that question help
define the boundaries of constitutional rights? And is it possible
to answer any constitutional question of this type without an a
priori theory of the constitutional right at issue?
In addressing these questions, this Article contributes to
scholarship on the Second Amendment, and on constitutional law
more generally, in three ways. First, it demonstrates that “gun
control”—conventionally understood as direct legislative regulation of the use, possession, sale, and manufacture of firearms—is
just one part of a larger regulatory environment. Second, it offers
7
Heller, 554 US at 575 (discussing the DC Code’s exceptions to the safe-storage requirement, including exceptions for places of business and for lawful recreational purposes).
8
See, for example, Estate of Strever v Cline, 924 P2d 666, 669 (Mont 1996) (“We
conclude that Susanj did owe a duty to not only Robert but also to the public in general
to store his firearm and ammunition in a safe and prudent manner.”).
9
See, for example, People v Heber, 745 NYS2d 835, 842–43 (NY Sup 2002) (denying a motion to dismiss on charges of negligent homicide and reckless endangerment after a child accidently shot and killed himself because he found a loaded gun that the
owner had not stored properly). See also Nicholas J. Johnson, et al, Firearms Law and
the Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights, and Policy 19 (Wolters Kluwer 2012) (“As
with any potentially lethal instrument, the general rules of criminal and civil negligence
apply to your use and storage of a firearm.”).
Although criminal and civil liability have some important differences—obvious state
action, constitutionally guaranteed procedure, and the like—for our purposes they are
relevantly similar when they do not target guns as such and therefore do not constitute
traditional gun control.
10 See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for SelfDefense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L Rev 1443, 1456–
61 (2009).
11 We focus here on the threshold question of coverage and not on the level of protection—that is, we are interested in whether the Second Amendment applies at all.
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a framework with which to evaluate the constitutional salience
of incidental burdens. Finally, it highlights the need for a more
comprehensive and integrated theory of the Second Amendment
and outlines three such theories.
Part I identifies how the law regulates firearms in ways
that are not conventionally thought of as gun control. Blackletter tort law, criminal law, and property law define individual
freedoms to legally keep, carry, and use firearms. Whether the
issue is liability for threatening displays of guns,12 negligence for
the alleged misuse of weapons,13 or the exclusion of guns from
private property,14 these legal rules can have a significant impact on the possession and use of guns. The legal burdens they
impose can be thought of as incidental because they do not explicitly regulate guns as such.15
As a general matter, such incidental burdens on constitutional rights are a widespread phenomenon. With varying levels
of success, judges and scholars have examined incidental burdens on speech,16 religious practice,17 property,18 and other constitutionally protected activities.19 By contrast, few courts and
12

See Part I.A.2.
See Part I.B.
14 See Part I.C.
15 We do not suppose that the line between direct and incidental burdens in this
context will always be clear, any more than the line between such burdens is clear when
it comes to speech. But drawing the line between laws that explicitly regulate guns and
those that do not seems to be a reasonable first pass at the problem. For a related discussion in the First Amendment context, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the
Constitution, 75 Iowa L Rev 111, 112 (1989):
13

A law is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” if it (a) does not explicitly restrict speech, and (b) is not justified by reference to interests that are directly related to the restriction of speech, and (c) does not restrict expressive conduct because of the reactions of others to the content of the message conveyed.
16 See, for example, Cohen v Cowles Media Co, 501 US 663, 665 (1991) (holding that
the First Amendment does not exempt journalists from generally applicable rules regarding promissory estoppel); Clark v Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 US 288,
289 (1984) (holding that the First Amendment does not exempt political protests from
generally applicable National Park Service rules regarding camping).
17 See, for example, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v Smith, 494 US 872, 878–82 (1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability
are not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause).
18 The regulatory takings inquiry has similar features, inasmuch as it seeks to
identify laws that do not directly “take” property but should nonetheless be treated as
having done so. See Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 123–
24 (1978) (describing a three-factor test).
19 For simplicity’s sake, at this initial stage we use “constitutionally protected activity” as something of a shorthand, recognizing that constitutional rights prevent certain kinds of rules rather than prevent protected activities per se. See generally Matthew
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commentators have yet paid sustained attention to the regulation of guns by anything other than conventional gun control.20
This omission is in need of a remedy, and soon. The superheated politics of guns mean that nearly any regulatory measure
can spark a conflagration over “gun control” without any agreement on what that term actually means.21 Further, incidental
burdens on gun-related activities are likely to become more visible and contested, especially in places where traditional gun
control is rolled back by legislative or judicial actions or where
states impose strict scrutiny standards of review through state
constitutional amendments.22 Moreover, the kinds of neutral
laws that impose these incidental burdens also establish baselines against which Second Amendment concepts like “lawabiding citizens” and “lawful purposes”23 are defined. Recent
statutory changes24 shift these baselines, generating unforeseen
constitutional consequences.25 Any complete discussion of the
D. Adler, Rights against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97
Mich L Rev 1 (1998).
20 This omission is by no means universal, however. See generally, for example,
Don B. Kates, The Limited Importance of Gun Control from a Criminological Perspective,
in Timothy D. Lytton, ed, Suing the Gun Industry: A Battle at the Crossroads of Gun
Control and Mass Torts 62 (Michigan 2006); Tom Diaz, The American Gun Industry: Designing & Marketing Increasingly Lethal Weapons, in Lytton, ed, Suing the Gun Industry
84 (cited in note 20). See also Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense
in Tort and Criminal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second
Amendment Musings, 60 Hastings L J 1205, 1231–43 (2009); Andrew Jay McClurg, The
Second Amendment Right to Be Negligent, 68 U Fla L Rev *15–35 (forthcoming 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/A7K7-36DE.
21 See, for example, Amanda Crawford, Arizona Cities May Sell Guns under Antidestruction Bill (Bloomberg, Feb 20, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5M96-BM7U
(quoting Charles Heller of the Arizona Citizens Defense League as saying that
“[a]nything that diminishes the use and the utility of firearms—anything—is gun control”); Michael S. Rosenwald, Store Backs Away from Smart Guns Following Outcry from
2nd Amendment Activists (Wash Post, Mar 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EUP4
-7NDC (discussing opposition to the marketing of a gun with smart technology).
22 See, for example, La Const Art I, § 11; Mo Const Art I, § 23.
23 Heller, 554 US at 625 (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”). See also id at 644 (Stevens
dissenting) (“[W]hen it finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the Second
Amendment, the Court limits the protected class to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”).
24 See, for example, Niraj Chokshi, What Georgia’s Expansive New Pro-Gun Law Does
(Wash Post, Apr 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/L96H-MSV5. See also Jeffrey A.
Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82 Fordham L Rev 1689, 1716–23 (2014) (exploring the related question of how courts should address common-law questions in the
“gaps” between related statutes).
25 See, for example, Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 63 Wash U L Rev
*1 (forthcoming 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/74KM-EPNA (arguing that “enhanced
Second Amendment rights trigger Fourth Amendment protections that could radically
transform American policing”). By focusing on these contemporary developments, we do
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regulatory landscape, whether laudatory or critical, must account for these types of incidental burdens.
Identifying these burdens is only part of the task; whether
and when incidental burdens raise constitutional concerns is an
exceedingly vexing question whose answer is often assumed rather than articulated.26 It is difficult to discern a transsubstantive rule or set of principles from the Supreme Court’s occasional
forays into the field. In some cases, the Court unhesitatingly
subjects standard tort and contract claims to constitutional scrutiny.27 In others, the Court insulates laws of general applicability
from constitutional review.28 In either set of cases, the threshold
question is whether the Constitution applies at all, and that
question rarely has an obvious answer. For example, it is tempting to dismiss tort claims as private ordering between individuals that are not subject to the Constitution. But as free speech
doctrine demonstrates, the constitutional issue cannot be avoided so easily.29
Part II of this Article suggests a framework with which to
approach these questions, using incidental burdens to illuminate
the boundary conditions of the Second Amendment. While some
direct burdens on the right to keep and bear arms implicate the
Constitution, others, for reasons of history or longevity, do not.30
Equally, there may be some indirect burdens that do not directly
regulate guns but that implicate the Constitution because of their
history, significance to the individual, structural consequences, or
not mean to slight the importance of other tectonic shifts in the law, such as the rise of
strict liability in products-liability cases over the past few decades.
26 See Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1767 (cited in note 1) (“[T]he question whether
the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer is too often
simply assumed.”).
27 See, for example, New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 268 (1964) (subjecting libel law to scrutiny under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Shelley v
Kraemer, 334 US 1, 18–23 (1948) (subjecting property and contract law to scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429, 431–32 (1984) (subjecting
family law to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment).
28 See, for example, Smith, 494 US at 878–79.
29 See Part II.B.3.
30 See Heller, 554 US at 626–27:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.
See also Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment
Can Teach Us about the Second, 122 Yale L J 852, 867 (2013).
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purpose. We suggest that these four factors—discussed in detail
below31—represent modalities that judges can employ to determine
whether an incidental burden raises a constitutional question.32
Judicial use of these modalities will define the contours of
the Second Amendment, separating constitutional space from
nonconstitutional space. And the jurisprudential significance of
that separation will increase if the Supreme Court continues to
edge away from the tiers of scrutiny and toward a more rulebased approach.33 In a regime that puts a premium on clearly defined boundaries and bright lines, the question of constitutional
coverage is critical—if not dispositive—and so it is essential to
identify the tools with which courts may draw those lines.
But as Part III shows, these modalities for evaluating incidental burdens—their history, individual significance, structural
relevance, and purpose—also demand a more comprehensive account of the Second Amendment. As a doctrinal matter, Heller
may have resolved the decades-long fight over whether the
Amendment is limited to militia service or extends to individual
uses such as self-defense. But defining the Second Amendment
as protecting an individual right does not end the debate about
the right’s purpose any more than the individual nature of free
speech resolves the question whether that freedom primarily
protects autonomy,34 promotes democracy,35 or facilitates a marketplace of ideas.36
There are at least three plausible ways to understand the
individual self-defense right announced in Heller.37 The first

31

See Part II.B.
In this respect, we both differ from and acknowledge our debt to Professor Philip
Bobbitt’s six modalities of constitutional argument. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional
Fate: Theory of the Constitution 7–8, 93–94 (Oxford 1982).
33 The Second Amendment provides a particularly useful object of study in this regard because the individual right it protects was only recently recognized by the Supreme Court. See Heller, 554 US at 592. The nascent doctrine is thus largely unburdened by precedent, and it is more directly reflective of current trends that seem to favor
rules over standards. See Joseph Blocher, Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness of RulesBased Jurisprudence, 46 Tulsa L Rev 431, 432–33 (2011) (describing Chief Justice John
Roberts’s preference for rules over standards).
34 See, for example, C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S Cal L
Rev 979, 981 (1997).
35 See, for example, Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to SelfGovernment 94 (Harper & Brothers 1948).
36 See, for example, Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes
dissenting).
37 These three theories strike us as covering the most plausible self-defense theories of the Second Amendment, but there are certainly other possibilities. See generally
32
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approach is that the Second Amendment right protects individual
gun owners’ autonomy, irrespective of its impact on public or personal safety or the ability to resist the government. A second approach posits that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to
self-defense against the government. A third approach is that,
just as truth is most likely to emerge from an open marketplace of
ideas, optimal security is likely to occur when people can freely
keep and bear arms as a deterrent to antagonists—a marketplace
of violence, so to speak.38 On this view, just as “the counter to
negative or damaging speech is to allow more speech,”39 the “only
thing that stops a bad guy with a gun, is a good guy with a gun.”40
These three theories lead to different conclusions regarding
which burdens on guns should be recognized as constitutionally
salient. All three have descriptive and normative merits and
demerits. Our goal here is to describe these theories and their
importance rather than to choose one over the others. We suspect that the Second Amendment, like the First Amendment,
will be shaped largely in a common-law fashion by the competition between these approaches or others like them and that no
single approach will fully displace the others.
Looking beyond the doctrine and theory for a moment, our
(perhaps immodest) hope is to help reframe the gun debate.
People sometimes treat that debate as one between gun control
on the one hand and the Second Amendment on the other,41 and
the parties often fight about “gun control” without any agreement as to what that term really means. This confusion obscures
the degree to which gun regulation operates within a complex
legal and social ecology. Cutting back on gun control will increase the relevance of incidental burdens on guns; repealing
Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second
Amendment, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 131 (2008).
38 See Part III.C.
39 Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and Popular Democracy, 79 Denver U L Rev 65, 87 (2001), citing New York Times, 376 US at 304.
See also Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis concurring) (“If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
40 Peter Overby, NRA: ‘Only Thing That Stops a Bad Guy with a Gun Is a Good
Guy with a Gun’ (NPR, Dec 21, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/QU56-TPE6 (quoting
National Rifle Association (NRA) Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre).
41 See, for example, Tim Devaney, GOP Gains Slam Door on Gun Control Push (The
Hill, Nov 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZN8D-L94J (quoting NRA spokeswoman
Jennifer Baker as saying that “[w]e now have a Senate leader [Mitch McConnell] who is
pro-Second Amendment, so it will be more difficult for them to pass gun control
measures”). See also generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 BU L Rev 813 (2014).
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statutes will lead to more private ordering through law; the social acceptance or rejection of practices like open carry will determine whether those practices are tortious. The gun debate,
like the Second Amendment itself, is about more than just gun
control.
I. INCIDENTAL BURDENS ON GUNS
Falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater and causing a
panic is the prototypical example of constitutionally unprotected
speech.42 In the wake of the mass murder in Aurora, Colorado,43
and other movie theater shootings,44 falsely shouting “Gun!” and
causing a panic seems likely to be unprotected as well. What
happens, then, if a person actually brings a gun to a movie theater and causes a panic? Does the Second Amendment insulate
him from tort or criminal liability? Recently, opponents of gun
regulation have openly carried AR-15s outside meetings of gun
control groups45 (including those at which victims of gun violence
were speaking46), at rallies opposing President Barack Obama47
(including those at which the president was present48), and in
stores and restaurants.49 In response, some private businesses—
42 Schenck v United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic.”). See also Harry Kalven Jr, A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America
133 (Harper & Row 1988) (“Schenck—and perhaps even Holmes himself—are best remembered for the example of the man ‘falsely shouting fire’ in a crowded theater.”).
43 Michael Pearson, Gunman Turns ‘Batman’ Screening into Real-Life ‘Horror Film’
(CNN, July 20, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/WBX5-JDT5 (describing the mass
murder of individuals at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, during a showing of The
Dark Knight Rises).
44 See, for example, Doug Stanglin, No Bail for Suspect in Texting Shooting at Movie Theater (USA Today, Jan 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y2VW-5TYT (describing a movie theater shooting in Florida after a dispute over texting).
45 See Cathaleen Qiao Chen, A Right-to-Bear-Arms Twist: Rallying with a Gun in
Hand (NY Times, Apr 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P9SD-WW5K; Liz Klimas,
Open Carry Advocates Stand outside Moms against Gun Violence Meeting: Tell Us If You
Think They Went Too Far (The Blaze, Nov 11, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/U7Y7
-NZKY.
46 See Jessica Chasmar, 1 Arrested after Gun Rights, Gun Control Activists Clash
at N.H. Rally Hosted by Bloomberg Group (Wash Times, June 19, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/255K-MYRJ.
47 Carol Cratty, Man Carries Assault Rifle to Obama Protest—and It’s Legal (CNN,
Aug 18, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/9KJD-9BQN.
48 Declan McCullagh, Gun-Toting Man Draws Scrutiny outside Obama Town Hall
(CBS News, Aug 11, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/EV9E-R3GX.
49 See Carol Kuruvilla, Armed Gun Activists Gather at Newtown Starbucks, Sparking
Outrage in the Grieving Community (NY Daily News, Aug 10, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/HQL7-TT7E (describing a clash between gun-rights and gun control activists
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Target and Starbucks among them—have begun posting “no guns”
signs.50 If a gun owner disregards such a sign and is charged with
trespass, can he raise a Second Amendment defense?51
These scenarios raise questions about the regulation of guns
but not about gun control as such. Some involve private rights
and others derive from public regulations, but they all involve
generally applicable rules—tort law, property law, and the
like—that occasionally apply to gun-related activities. The burdens that these regulations impose on the possession and use of
guns are therefore incidental to the regulatory text and overall
design. These burdens often are ignored in popular and scholarly debates about gun control and the Second Amendment, but
they raise extraordinarily important and complex questions. The
goal of the following discussion is to illustrate the scope of those
questions and the potential applicability of these neutral rules
to gun-related activities. Part II presents a framework with
which to identify whether these rules, as applied to gun-related
activity, raise Second Amendment questions.
A.

Intentional Torts and Criminal Law

Perhaps the most obvious legal rules that implicate gun
ownership and use are intentional torts, such as assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and the analogous criminal prohibitions that forbid activities like “menacing.”
Gun possession is not a necessary element of these legal rules—
they apply whether a person wields a gun, a hammer, or no
weapon at all.52 And because these rules do not focus on guns as
such, the burdens that they impose on the freedom to keep and
bear arms are incidental.

at a Starbucks roughly two miles from the scene of the Newtown elementary school
shooting where gun activists had gathered to support Starbucks for allowing its customers to carry firearms in its stores).
50 Ben Brody, Target to Customers: No Guns Please (CNN, July 2, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/WN92-CPG4 (noting that some businesses, including Target, Chili’s,
and Sonic, have requested that customers enter unarmed).
51 See Ellen Jean Hirst and Bob McCoppin, Concealed Carry: Illinois Businesses Face a
Loaded Issue over Concealed Carry Law (Chi Trib, July 29, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/32ZX-6MG6 (analyzing the heated debate over whether business owners can
or should prohibit concealed-carry-permit holders from carrying guns on their property).
52 There are, of course, many gun-specific crimes and sentencing enhancements.
See, for example, 28 USC § 924(c) (setting mandatory minimum sentences for persons
who use or carry firearms in furtherance of certain crimes). We hold these aside because
they are more likely to impose direct burdens on the keeping and bearing of arms.
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1. Assault and related crimes.
A person commits an assault when he acts either intending
to cause harmful or offensive contact with another person or intending to put another person in imminent apprehension of such
contact, and the other person is thereby put in such imminent
apprehension.53 Unsurprisingly, the use of a gun can contribute
to civil liability in assault cases. A person who points a gun at
another person and thereby creates a reasonable fear of imminent harm has committed an assault.54 The mere mention of a
gun is probably not enough to satisfy this standard,55 but a gunwielding person can be held liable for assault even if the gun is
not loaded,56 if it is not pointed at anyone,57 or if no one sees it.58
The same basic rules apply to criminal assault59 and related
crimes. Actions that give rise to tort liability for assault may also give rise to criminal liability on a variety of other grounds. It
is generally illegal, for example, to “menace” a person,60 and the
use of a gun can be a factor in determining liability.61 This is not
53 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965). See also Kline v Kline, 64 NE 9, 9
(Ind 1902).
54 See, for example, Jordan v Wilson, 5 S3d 442, 449 (Miss App 2008) (“In her complaint, Jordan alleged that Wilson pointed a firearm at her and that she feared for her
life. This was sufficient to state a claim for the intentional tort of assault.”); Lowry v
Standard Oil Co of California, 146 P2d 57, 60 (Cal App 1944) (“The pointing of a gun at
another in a threatening manner is sufficient to cause fear of personal injury unless it is
known by the person at whom the weapon is pointed that the gun is in fact unloaded.”);
Chapman v State, 78 Ala 463, 464 (1884) (holding that brandishing an unloaded gun will
not support a conviction for criminal assault but may sustain a civil tort suit).
55 See Durivage v Tufts, 51 A2d 847, 849 (NH 1947) (holding that the plaintiff could
not maintain a tort action for assault based solely on the defendant’s verbal threat that
he would shoot the plaintiff if he had a gun).
56 See Beach v Hancock, 27 NH 223, 229 (1853) (“So if a person present a pistol,
purporting to be a loaded pistol, at another, and so near as to have been dangerous to life
if the pistol had gone off; semble that this is an assault, even though the pistol were, in
fact, not loaded.”).
57 See Castiglione v Galpin, 325 S2d 725, 726 (La App 1976) (“[W]e are convinced
from the circumstances surrounding the incident that defendant’s action (whether the
gun remained on defendant’s lap or was pointed at plaintiffs) resulted in plaintiffs being
placed in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery and was sufficient to constitute
an assault.”).
58 See State v Misner, 763 P2d 23, 25 (Mont 1988) (“We conclude that it was not
necessary that Mr. Taber personally observe the gun being waved at him in order to experience reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury.”).
59 See State v Hagberg, 920 P2d 86, 90 (Mont 1996) (upholding a conviction for felony assault when the victim believed, but did not see, that the defendant was holding a
gun out of his sight).
60 William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 94 (Cavendish
2001) (Wayne Morrison, ed) (originally published 1768).
61 See State v Wardlow, 1999 WL 595357, *2 (Ohio App):
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to say that the simple act of carrying a gun is criminal menacing
(at least not in states where open carry is legal62), only that it can
be in certain circumstances—if the gun is pointed at someone else,
for example63 (though this does not seem to be strictly required64).
Some jurisdictions treat these incidents separately as “unlawful
display[s] of a firearm,”65 but we hold such laws aside because the
burdens they impose are direct rather than incidental.66
2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress and
disturbing the peace.
A person commits the tort of IIED when he intentionally
causes “severe emotional harm” to another person by engaging

The jury was presented with two divergent stories, i.e., that while ordering the
men off her property she either pointed the gun at the men, or that she simply
held the gun at her side. If the jury believed the former, she was guilty of at
least Menacing; if it believed the latter, she was not guilty of anything.
See also People v Silva, 680 NYS2d 43, 44 (NY Crim 1998) (“[D]efendant[’s] state[ment]
that he was going to ‘smoke’ the undercover police officer . . . conjoined with defendant’s
simultaneous action of reaching into his waistband, an area traditionally associated with
a secreted handgun . . . makes out the crime of second-degree Menacing.”); City of Akron
v Boyd, 1983 WL 3904, *1 (Ohio App) (affirming the conviction of a defendant convicted
of menacing when he placed a holstered gun on his lap pointing toward another person).
62 See, for example, Ex parte Pate, 145 S3d 733, 738 (Ala 2013) (“[W]e conclude that
Pate’s getting the gun, without more, was not sufficient to establish the physical-action
element of menacing.”); Graham v Commonwealth, 667 SW2d 697, 699 (Ky App 1983)
(holding that a gun “being waved at someone rather than just being brandished in the
air” constituted menacing).
63 Wood v State, 2003 WL 22863086, *2 (Del) (holding that pointing a gun at someone is menacing).
64 See People v Hines, 780 P2d 556, 559 (Colo 1989) (“We also conclude that an offender may commit felony menacing by the ‘use’ of a firearm without actually pointing
the firearm at another person.”).
65 State v Baggett, 13 P3d 659, 662 (Wash App 2000) (upholding a conviction for the
unlawful display of a firearm). See also People v Hall, 100 Cal Rptr 2d 279, 285 (Cal App
2000) (discussing the crime of “draw[ing] or exhibit[ing] any firearm, whether loaded or
unloaded,” and concluding that “[w]hen the evidence shows the weapon was exhibited in
a rude, angry or threatening manner, the offense is complete”).
66 For similar reasons, we do not discuss the important and interesting distinction
between “brandishing” and simple open carrying. See, for example, Morris v Commonwealth, 607 SE2d 110, 114 (Va 2005) (defining “to brandish” as “to exhibit or expose in
an ostentatious, shameless, or aggressive manner”); People v Sanders, 905 P2d 420, 457
(Cal 1996) (“The crime of brandishing consists of drawing or exhibiting, in the presence
of another person, any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, in a rude, angry or threatening manner. The weapon need not have been pointed directly at a victim.”) (citation
omitted); State v Overshon, 528 SW2d 142, 143 (Mo App 1975) (“[I]t [is] unlawful for a
person to exhibit, in the presence of one or more persons, a deadly weapon in a rude, angry or threatening manner.”) (quotation marks omitted).
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in “extreme and outrageous conduct.”67 In some circumstances,
the use of a gun may be the basis for an IIED claim68—for example, if the presence of a gun contributes to the emotional distress
that is inflicted.69 But as the definition suggests, the burden on
the plaintiff is extremely high: simply being scared by the presence of a gun70 is generally not enough.71
The closest criminal analogues to the tort of IIED are rules
against harassment,72 disorderly conduct,73 and disturbance of the
peace74 (or its historical antecedent, affray75). For these purposes,

67

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 46 (2012).
See Cullison v Medley, 570 NE2d 27, 31 (Ind 1991) (noting the possibility of IIED
when the defendants threatened harm while one was armed with a revolver).
69 Compare Davis v Copelan, 452 SE2d 194, 203 (Ga App 1994) (finding sufficient
evidence to support an IIED claim when “there [was] evidence that Pat Cheek conspired
with Officer Russell to separately and unexpectedly call plaintiffs to her office for the
intimidating, abusive and well-planned termination interviews,” and further noting that
“the evidence show[ed] that Pat Cheek allowed an armed law enforcement officer to attend the meetings; that she permitted the officer to dominate the meetings and that she
acquiesced in the officer’s intimidating, overbearing and abusive conduct”), with Holloway v Wachovia Bank & Trust Co, NA, 452 SE2d 233, 236, 243–44 (NC 1994) (upholding summary judgment against one plaintiff on an IIED claim despite an allegation that
the defendant had aimed a gun at the plaintiff, because the plaintiff ’s own testimony indicated that she did not suffer severe and disabling emotional distress, while reversing
summary judgment for the other plaintiffs).
70 See, for example, Sharp v Paul, 2013 WL 1278185, *3 (Cal App) (finding that evidence did not support a restraining order, which is subject to same standard as IIED,
because the plaintiff admitted both that he did not feel threatened when the defendant
pointed the gun at him and that the defendant did not intend to threaten him); Montross
v United Parcel Service of America, Inc, 2002 WL 318336, *1 (ND Tex) (affirming summary judgment dismissing an IIED claim when the defendant’s employee, “who had a
camera at the time, suggested that Ritman point the rifle at Montross’s head so she
could take a picture . . . which caused Montross to fear for his safety”).
71 See, for example, Clark v Elam Sand and Gravel, Inc, 777 NYS2d 624, 625 (NY
Sup 2004) (rejecting an IIED claim when the alleged wrongful conduct consisted of
“showing [the plaintiff] a gun on various occasions and by innuendo he would use to
shoot whoever installed the devices, he would become belligerent, slam doors, talk sarcastically to the Plaintiff and sarcastically asked to use the phones when there was no
need to do so”) (brackets in original).
72 See, for example, MPC § 250.4 (ALI 1962).
73 See, for example, MPC § 250.2 (ALI 1962); City of Chicago v Roma, 374 NE2d
1097, 1098 (Ill App 1978) (reversing a conviction for disorderly conduct when the defendant’s gun was “was wrapped in a plastic bag, [in] an attache case . . . approximately 25
feet away” from him).
74 See, for example, State v Albert, 184 SE2d 605, 607 (SC 1971) (affirming the defendant’s conviction for rioting, defined as a “tumultuous disturbance of the peace,” for
taking control of the library at Vorhees College while armed).
75 See, for example, Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The
Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L Rev 487, 501 (2004) (discussing
the use of affray to regulate gun-related activities).
68
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we hold aside related prohibitions on brandishing,76 unlawful
display,77 and riding armed to the terror of the people,78 each of
which imposes direct burdens on arms-related activities.
As with assault, the use of a gun is neither necessary nor
sufficient to create liability under these rules, but it can still be
an important contributing factor.79 The manner in which a person carries or displays a gun,80 the reasonableness of the plaintiff ’s response,81 and an assessment of the overall context will all
factor into whether liability attaches.
Consider the practice of openly carrying guns to gun control
rallies,82 including those at which victims of gun violence are
speaking.83 It is plausible to think that this inflicts emotional
distress on the speakers and that doing so is the intent of some
(although of course not all) of the carriers.84 It might even be considered “extreme and outrageous”85 to, for example, bring AR-15s

76

See, for example, Cal Penal Code § 417 (criminalizing brandishing a weapon).
See, for example, State v Byrd, 868 P2d 158, 162 (Wash App 1994) (“The gravamen of the offense of unlawful display of a weapon is displaying and handling of the
weapon in a manner ‘that either manifests an intent to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for the safety of other persons.’”).
78 See, for example, ALI, Model Penal Code: Council Draft No 29 47 (Feb 23, 1961)
(citing individual state codes listing an aggravating factor to misdemeanor riot as “carrying a dangerous weapon”); Portland City Code § 14A.06.010(A) (“It is unlawful for any
person to knowingly possess or carry a firearm, in or upon a public place . . . having
failed to remove all the ammunition.”); Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw 3, ch 3 (1328)
(“[N]o Man great nor small . . . [shall] ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets
. . . nor in no part elsewhere.”).
79 See, for example, Cortez v State, 256 SW2d 855, 855 (Tex Crim App 1953) (“There
is no offense known as ‘rudely displaying a pistol,’ but such may constitute a violation of
the disturbing-the-peace statute, when done in a manner calculated to disturb the
peace.”) (citation omitted).
80 See, for example, State v Turley, 521 P2d 690, 691 (Mont 1974) (upholding a conviction for disturbance of the peace when “[t]he State’s evidence show[ed] that appellant
was slapping his pistol against his leg in an agitated manner; he unholstered the weapon
and pointed it at Fairhurst; he threatened to shoot him; and he spat at Fairhurst’s departing automobile”).
81 See Byrd, 868 P2d at 162 (finding that, for the crime of unlawful display, there
“is no necessary nexus between reasonable apprehension and the defendant’s actual intent” but that “[u]nder some circumstances, apprehension could be reasonable at the
mere sight of a firearm, while the defendant’s intent could be completely innocent”).
82 See, for example, Diana Reese, Moms Demonstrate for Gun Control, Armed Men
Stage Counter-Protest in Indiana (Wash Post, Mar 29, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/3RZ3-36V5.
83 See note 46.
84 See Mark Follman, Spitting, Stalking, Rape Threats: How Gun Extremists Target
Women (Mother Jones, May 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NW5D-U8AP.
85 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 46 (2012).
77
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to an event dedicated to the victims of a mass shooting perpetrated with an AR-15.86
Gun carriers might respond that this is all backward, that
simply showing a gun to a person who dislikes them is not tortious,87 and that in fact the gun carriers’ intent is to normalize guns
rather than to inflict emotional distress.88 Perhaps open carry will
cause some distress in the short term, but once people see that
guns contribute to safety instead of threaten it, the basis for legal
liability will weaken. In this way, shifting private law baselines—
informed by social practice—may be outcome determinative.
Statutory changes can also nudge the baselines in one direction or another. In the context of IIED claims for gun carrying,
for example, one would have to take into account open-carry
laws, which could be said to represent a public determination
that guns are not threatening. In this case, liability for IIED
(and even for assault) should be even harder to prove. For example, as of 1967, simply carrying a concealed weapon could
constitute a breach of the peace in Florida.89 Today, the state has
a “shall issue” regime for concealed-carry permits.90 That change
in the background law has major implications for legal liability.91

86

See note 46.
Cullison, 570 NE2d at 31 (concluding that the defendant’s knowledge of the
plaintiff ’s apprehension toward guns was not sufficient on its own to support the conclusion that the defendant intended to inflict emotional injury on the plaintiff when he wore
a gun in front of the plaintiff).
88 See, for example, Klimas, Open Carry Advocates Stand outside Moms against
Gun Violence Meeting (cited in note 45) (quoting an e-mail from Open Carry Texas that
stated: “What we are doing is working and society is coming to view the sight of ‘military
style rifles’ in public as just another normal thing. Isn’t that a good thing?”).
89 See Marden v State, 203 S2d 638, 640 (Fla App 1967).
90 Fla Stat Ann § 790.06(2).
91 With regard to legal liability, it is important to note that these incidental burdens—and others discussed below—might be limited in certain circumstances by the law
of self-defense, which is the “central component” of the Second Amendment. McDonald v
City of Chicago, Illinois, 561 US 742, 767 (2010) (“Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we
held that individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment
right.”) (citation omitted). How much self-defense law is now constitutional law is an incredibly complex inquiry. What is clear is that, at least as currently construed, the Second Amendment is simultaneously broader and narrower than the common-law rule:
broader in the sense that it does not require an imminent threat or an objectively justifiable apprehension of harm to keep a gun; narrower in the sense that it protects only particular implements used for self-defense. See MPC § 3.04(1) (ALI 1962) (“[T]he use of
force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force
is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”).
87
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Negligence

Blackletter negligence law imposes liability on those who
cause harm by failing to fulfill a duty of care that is owed to another person.92 Standard negligence doctrine builds in a kind of
cost-benefit analysis—if the alleged tortfeasor failed to take costjustified measures to prevent the harm, then he may be liable.93
Unsurprisingly, the misuse of guns can give rise to liability for
civil and criminal negligence, as well as liability under related
rules regarding civil and criminal recklessness.94
Perhaps the most heartbreaking cases are those in which a
child is hurt or killed by an unsecured weapon, a tragedy that
occurs hundreds of times every year.95 It is also negligent to give,
sell, or surrender a gun to an adult who is likely to, and does,
misuse it.96 Such liability is nothing new. Section 308 of the Second Restatement of Torts explained that

92

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 284 (1965).
See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947) (“[I]f the
probability [of an accident] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B < PL.”). See also Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand L Rev 813,
817–18 (2001).
94 See, for example, Al-Saud v State, 658 NE2d 907, 910 (Ind 1995) (noting that
“[t]he brandishing of a firearm in a congested area or during a dispute can create a variety of risks of bodily injury to others, regardless of whether the weapon is loaded,” and
that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the defendant “committed a delinquent
act, i.e., an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute criminal recklessness”);
Matter of ALJ, 836 P2d 307, 310 (Wyo 1992) (“We interpret § 6–2–504(b) to mean that,
whenever an actor knowingly points a firearm at another, whether the firearm is loaded
or not, he is guilty of reckless endangering, provided the firearm was not pointed for defensive purposes.”).
In a forthcoming article, Professor Andrew McClurg argues that “through both common
and statutory law, the United States has enshrined a de facto Second Amendment right to
be negligent regarding many aspects of making, distributing, and possessing firearms.”
McClurg, 68 U Fla L Rev at *1 (cited in note 20) (citation omitted). He goes on to criticize
this result as “ignor[ing] or mischaracteriz[ing the] fundamental scope of liability principles,” and he says that it “is derived from deference to Second Amendment rights.” Id at *2,
6. We are in no position to fully evaluate McClurg’s descriptive account of the doctrine. To
the degree that it is accurate, however, we agree that the Second Amendment cannot
properly be read to provide blanket immunity for gun-related activities.
95 Mark Berman, How Often Do Children in the U.S. Unintentionally Shoot and
Kill People? We Don’t Know (Wash Post, Sept 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4BHZ
-SBSY (reporting 591 victims of accidental gun violence in 2011, 102 of which were children under the age of 18). See also Michael Luo and Mike McIntire, Children and Guns:
The Hidden Toll (NY Times, Sept 28, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4M5K-R7FW.
96 See, for example, Angell v F. Avanzini Lumber Co, 363 S2d 571, 572 (Fla App 1978)
(holding that sellers of a gun who could have inferred from the buyer’s “erratic behavior”
93
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[i]t is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to
engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor,
if the actor knows or should know that such person intends
or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of
harm to others.97
And specifically, the Restatement noted that “it is negligent to
place loaded firearms . . . within reach of young children or feebleminded adults.”98 These rules do not mean that a gun’s owner is
responsible for all negative consequences of the gun’s misuse99
but rather that the owner is responsible only for misuse that is
foreseeable,100 such as when he sells the gun to a person who is
underage,101 mentally ill,102 or intoxicated.103

that “injury to someone was highly probable” could be held liable for the resulting
death).
97 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308 (1965).
98 Restatement (Second) of Torts at § 308, comment b (1965). See also, for example,
Herland v Izatt, 345 P3d 661, 665 (Utah 2015):
[G]un owners have a duty to exercise reasonable care in supplying their guns
to others—such as children and incompetent or impaired individuals—whom
they know, or should know, are likely to use the gun in a manner that creates a
foreseeable risk of injury to themselves or third parties.
See also Wroth v McKinney, 373 P2d 216, 219 (Kan 1962) (“It is negligent to place loaded
firearms or poisons within reach of young children or feeble-minded adults.”); Kuhns v
Brugger, 135 A2d 395, 402–03 (Pa 1957) (finding that prima facie negligence was established by, inter alia, the defendant’s storage of a loaded pistol in an unlocked dresser
drawer).
99 See Rains v Bend of the River, 124 SW3d 580, 595 (Tenn App 2003) (“[T]here is
no evidence that his conduct or demeanor when he purchased the ammunition should
have given the clerk at Bend of the River reason to foresee or anticipate that he intended
to use the ammunition to commit suicide or to misuse it in any other way.”).
100 See, for example, Jupin v Kask, 849 NE2d 829, 837 (Mass 2006) (“[T]he risk in
the instant case—that a mentally unstable and violent person, to whom unfettered and
unsupervised access to Kask’s home was granted, would take a gun from that home and
shoot someone—was both foreseeable and foreseen.”).
101 See, for example, Lake Washington School District No 414 v Schuck’s Auto Supply, Inc, 613 P2d 561, 562–63 (Wash App 1980) (explaining that a seller may be held liable for selling a “dangerous instrumentality” to a child whom the seller knows or ought
to know is, “by reason of youth and inexperience, unfit to be trusted with it” and who
then injures himself or a third party).
102 See, for example, Rubin v Johnson, 550 NE2d 324, 333 (Ind App 1990) (“[T]he
recognized unpredictability and dangerous propensities of the mentally ill make the likelihood of injury to third persons resulting from the sale of a handgun to an individual of
unsound mind appear to be logical, and, hence, reasonably [foreseeable].”).
103 See, for example, Angell, 363 S2d at 572 (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of
the plaintiff’s complaint and finding that a dealer in firearms could have foreseen the
probability of someone being injured after selling a firearm and ammunition to an “erratic” purchaser). See also Kitchen v K-Mart Corp, 697 S2d 1200, 1208 (Fla 1997) (“We hold
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In some areas, statutes have codified the common-law duty of
care. For example, many states have child-access prevention
(CAP) rules that impose civil or criminal liability on gun owners
who fail to exercise due care in keeping their guns out of the
hands of children who may misuse them.104 One perspective is
that these rules—like the DC safe-storage provision—are direct
regulations of firearms that implicate the Second Amendment.
But one might also say that CAP rules simply codify an otherwiseunremarkable negligence rule, just as some states have codified
the common-law standards for obscenity or libel to conform to
Supreme Court rulings.105
Conversely, some statutes preempt negligence liability for
gun-related activities. The most prominent example is the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act106 (PLCAA), which partially shields gun manufacturers from negligence liability for the
criminal misuse of their products.107 The PLCAA is not a flat bar
to liability; it specifically permits lawsuits for negligent entrustment and negligence per se.108 Nevertheless, such armsprotecting statutory laws can subtly shift the baseline for what
counts as gun control subject to the Second Amendment. Prior to
the PLCAA, many citizens likely understood state tort law concerning firearms as mere background law, no different than laws
that force a printer to clean up its toxic ink.109 Statutes like the
that an action for negligent entrustment as defined under section 390 of the Restatement
is consistent with Florida public policy in protecting its citizens from the obvious danger
of the placement of a firearm in the hands of an intoxicated person.”); Bernethy v Walt
Failor’s, Inc, 653 P2d 280, 284 (Wash 1982) (reversing summary judgment that was
granted to a gun shop on a wrongful death action brought after a visibly intoxicated
man obtained a gun and ammunition from the defendant gun shop and immediately
shot his wife).
104 Regulating Guns in America: An Evaluation and Comparative Analysis of Federal, State and Selected Local Gun Laws *233–34 (Legal Community Against Violence,
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/F9S8-MTSP.
105 Compare NC Gen Stat § 14-190.1(b), and Mich Comp Laws § 600.2911(6), with
Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973), and New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US
254, 279–80 (1964).
106 Pub L No 109-92, 119 Stat 2095 (2005), codified in various sections of Titles 15
and 18.
107 The law provides that “[a] qualified civil liability action may not be brought in
any Federal or State court.” 15 USC § 7902(a). “Qualified civil liability action” is defined
as “a civil action . . . brought by any person against a . . . seller of a [firearm] . . . for
damages . . . resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a [firearm] by the person
or a third party.” 15 USC § 7903(5)(A).
108 See, for example, Estate of Kim v Coxe, 295 P3d 380, 386 (Alaska 2013); Gilland
v Sportsmen’s Outpost, Inc, 2011 WL 2479693, *12 (Conn Super).
109 See United States v Fleet Factors Corp, 821 F Supp 707, 712–13 (SD Ga 1993) (finding the defendants, as “owners,” liable for the costs associated with the removal of hazardous
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PLCAA—accompanied as they are by Second Amendment justifications110—tend to accentuate the public nature of state tort
law, as opposed to the understanding of tort law as private ordering or restorative justice.
C.

Property

Whether the right to keep and bear arms extends beyond
one’s own property has been a central Second Amendment question in recent years.111 Some gun owners—especially open-carry
activists—also assert a right to carry guns onto other people’s
property, and in particular onto the property of private business
owners. Some business owners have responded by asserting a
right to exclude guns from their property.112 Whatever other legal issues are involved,113 these scenarios implicate basic principles of property law.
1. Trespass.
As a general matter, private property owners can exclude
whomever they want for whatever reasons they want.114 This
right to exclude is frequently called “one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights” known as property.115 Rules
against trespass are a significant method of protecting this
right.116
substances from a textile-printing facility); Grillo v Speedrite Products, Inc, 532 SE2d 1, 1–
2 (SC App 2000) (involving a personal injury action against an ink supplier).
110 As McClurg notes, the first statement of “[f]indings” in the PLCAA is: “The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” McClurg, 68 U Fla L Rev at *6 (cited in
note 20), quoting 15 USC § 7901(a)(1).
111 Compare Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F3d 1144, 1179 (9th Cir 2014), vacd
and rehearing en banc granted, 781 F3d 1106 (9th Cir 2015) (holding that California’s
“may issue” concealed-carry law requiring an applicant to show good cause for carrying
in public violates the Second Amendment), with Drake v Filko, 724 F3d 426, 440 (3d Cir
2013) (upholding New Jersey’s concealed-carry law requiring that an applicant present a
“justifiable need” before issuing a concealed-carry license).
112 See note 50 and accompanying text.
113 One of us has argued that in some circumstances private property owners have a
Second Amendment right to exclude guns. See generally Joseph Blocher, The Right Not
to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 Stan L Rev 1 (2012).
114 See William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England 3 (Cavendish
2001) (Wayne Morrison, ed) (originally published 1766) (describing the right of property as
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”).
115 Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 US 164, 176 (1979).
116 Trespass can also constitute a criminal offense, for example, when a person refuses to leave after being asked. See MPC § 221.2(2) (ALI 1962).
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Only an intentional, unprivileged entry onto the land of another constitutes trespass.117 The most straightforward way in
which an entry can be privileged is through the consent of the
owner.118 A person who enters private property with the permission of the owner or possessor has a license to do so and is not a
trespasser.119 This seems simple enough, and when permissions
are explicit, it usually is. But the apparent clarity of the consent
rule quickly gives way to hard questions both as a general matter and with specific regard to guns.
Consider the bases for privileged entry into a restaurant. A
person eating in a restaurant has a license to be there—the restaurant owner consents to her entry precisely because she is a customer.120 But what if that person is actually a harsh critic who
gains access by lying about her occupation? In that case, the license has been obtained through fraud—the restaurant owner
would not have consented to entry had he known her true identity.
The law sometimes regards such fraudulently obtained consent as a legitimate defense to a trespass action. Judge Richard
Posner’s opinion in Desnick v American Broadcasting Companies, Inc121 is perhaps the leading opinion explaining this surprising result.122 In Desnick, investigative journalists fraudulently obtained consent to enter ophthalmic clinics by posing as
patients and promising not to engage in “ambush” journalism.123
There was no doubt that the consent was obtained under false
pretenses.124 And yet the court recognized the consent as legitimate, because there was “no invasion . . . of any of the specific
interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect”—privacy, security, and the like.125

117

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, comment c (1965).
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, comment e (1965).
119 Holding aside unusual situations like estoppel, licenses can generally be revoked,
and a person whose license has been properly revoked must vacate the premises in a
reasonable time or else she will become a trespasser. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 171 (1965).
120 See Desnick v American Broadcasting Companies, Inc, 44 F3d 1345, 1351 (7th
Cir 1995) (giving the example of a restaurant critic, as well as others).
121 44 F3d 1345 (7th Cir 1995).
122 See Joseph William Singer, et al, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices 3–
4, 9–12 (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed 2014) (using Desnick to illustrate trespass and the right
to exclude).
123 Desnick, 44 F3d at 1348.
124 Id at 1354–55.
125 Id at 1352.
118
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Now replace the critic concealing her identity with a patron
concealing her handgun. Presumably, if the maître d’ knew she
was carrying a gun, he would have asked her to leave the gun in
her car or else refused to seat her, which is precisely why she
concealed it. Has the gun owner committed a trespass? Or is her
fraudulently obtained consent a defense, as it is for the restaurant critic? The basic analysis from cases like Desnick suggests
that the gun carrier is a trespasser, because—unlike the secret
critic—her fraud interferes with the interests that the right to
exclude is meant to protect, especially that of security.
But, one might object, a concealed carrier cannot be a trespasser absent some notice, actual or constructive, that the owner
prohibits private firearms on the premises. The default rule, in
other words, should be that business owners presumably consent to have guns on their property. Even if that were the rule,
the presumption could probably be overcome by a sign forbidding guns on the property. Posting a “no guns allowed” sign126
would arguably limit the scope of the privilege by conditioning
the grant of a license on the licensees’ agreement not to carry a
gun. And though such signs might not automatically transform
all concealed-gun-carrying shoppers into trespassers,127 it certainly would strengthen the conclusion that their licenses were
obtained by fraud.
As the sign-posting hypothetical suggests, neutral laws of
general applicability in property law, just like in negligence or
intentional tort, set baselines that impact the keeping and bearing of arms. For example, requiring gun owners to seek permission to carry their guns on another person’s land, rather than
requiring private property owners to identify and exclude guns,
would set a default rule that might well be outcome determinative. If state law said that guns were forbidden unless a bar or
restaurant explicitly permitted them,128 then businesses wishing
to allow guns would have to post a sign saying, “Guns allowed

126 See note 50 and accompanying text. Even better might be a “no guns allowed (except mine)” sign. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the
Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 NYU L Rev 887, 907–08 (2011); Blocher,
64 Stan L Rev at 26–37 (cited in note 113).
127 Desnick itself noted that the court was not resolving the question of “what if any
difference it would make if the plaintiffs had festooned the premises with signs forbidding the entry of testers or other snoops.” Desnick, 44 F3d at 1353.
128 “State law” for these purposes could be the equivalent of a reasonable-access
statute applicable to public businesses, or it could be simply the courts’ interpretations of
common-law trespass.
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here.” An alternative rule saying that guns are permitted unless
a business explicitly forbids them would lead to some signs saying, “No guns allowed.” Though both of these rules give business
owners the final say over whether to permit guns, the former regime would almost certainly result in less gun carrying overall
due to the inevitable stickiness of default rules.129
Just like open-range and closed-range rules in cattleranching areas,130 opt in and opt out regimes for gun carrying on
private property represent different ways to allocate the costs of
preventing certain kinds of harms. In an opt out regime (one in
which guns are forbidden only if the property owner makes it
so), business owners would have to make costly enforcement decisions by posting signs, interrogating potential customers, or—
especially in states that permit concealed carry—implementing
pat downs and metal detectors. In an opt in regime, by contrast,
gun carriers would face greater costs in that they would need to
seek out and identify gun-friendly businesses rather than relying on a default permission. Notably, Georgia’s recent gun law
incorporates both approaches: bars can opt out, while houses of
worship and schools can opt in.131
Some gun-rights advocates go further, saying that neither of
these default rules is strong enough and that, in fact, the constitutional and statutory regimes require private property owners—
at least those who open their property to the public—to permit
guns on their land.132 Law does, after all, sometimes abrogate the

129 See generally Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989).
130 Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 Stan L Rev 623, 662–63 (1986).
131 Ga Code Ann § 16-11-127(b)(6) (allowing bars to opt out); Ga Code Ann § 16-11127(c) (allowing places of worship to opt in); Ga Code Ann § 16-11-127.1(c) (allowing
schools to opt in).
132 See, for example, Jessica Marquez, Employers Fire Back at Law Making It a Felony to Ban Guns on Company Premises (Workforce, Jan 27, 2006), archived at
http://perma.cc/KNL3-LWSJ (quoting former NRA President Marion Hammer as saying,
“We have employers violating the constitutional rights of their employees”); Louise Red
Corn, NRA to Boycott Companies (Tulsa World, Aug 2, 2005), archived at
http://perma.cc/6AA4-GQMN (quoting NRA Executive Vice President LaPierre as saying,
“We’re going to make ConocoPhillips the example of what happens when a corporation
takes away your Second Amendment rights”); Darrel Rowland, Bill Would Allow Ohioans to Carry Concealed Firearms with No Permit, Training (The Columbus Dispatch,
Apr 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JL6U-BUJD (describing an Ohio bill that would
prevent landlords from barring tenants or their guests from having legal firearms).
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right to exclude—for example, on the basis of race.133 Some
common-law doctrines, like the “reasonable access” rule, require
inns and other common carriers to permit access to the public,134
although these doctrines do not yet require reasonable access to
an armed public. The issue is whether the baseline—opt in or
opt out, trespass or reasonable access—should be thought of as a
constitutional matter, and if it is a constitutional matter, what
tool of judicial delineation makes it so.135
2. Nuisance.
As a conceptual matter, nuisance law is a close cousin of
trespass.136 Private nuisance is typically defined as a substantial, unreasonable interference with another’s quiet enjoyment
of his property.137 Public nuisance law covers actions that impose
costs on a broader community rather than on a specific person.138
As with trespass, it is easy to imagine how gun ownership
and use might give rise to nuisance claims. Guns impose externalities, and controlling externalities is a central function of
nuisance law.139 A person shooting guns in his backyard, for example, might disturb his neighbors with the noise, sight, and
perceived risk either of the shooting itself or of the possibility
that lead bullets will contaminate their property or groundwater.140 In many areas, shooting guns even on one’s own private
133 See, for example, Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1, 19–21 (1948) (forbidding, on constitutional grounds, the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants); Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 243, codified at 42 USC § 2000a et seq.
134 See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw U L Rev 1283, 1305–31 (1996).
135 As with self-defense, intentional torts like battery and trespass include exceptions for cases of necessity. See Ploof v Putnam, 71 A 188, 189 (Vt 1908) (holding that a
ship captain could moor his ship on a private dock to escape a damaging storm). If a gun
carrier were fleeing a true threat or rushing to defend a person who was being assaulted,
for example, the necessity exception could protect him from civil or criminal trespass liability. See, for example, United States v Gomez, 92 F3d 770, 778 (9th Cir 1996) (finding
that the justification defense was available to a felon who was convicted for the possession of a gun when that felon faced an unlawful and present threat of death).
136 Singer, et al, Property Law at 365–66 (cited in note 122).
137 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (1965).
138 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1965).
139 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1965).
140 Concerned Citizens of Cedar Heights-Woodchuck Hill Road v DeWitt Fish and
Game Club, Inc, 755 NYS2d 192, 193 (NY App 2003):

The first cause of action alleges that defendant’s shooting range constitutes a
private nuisance and the second and third causes of action allege that it constitutes a public nuisance by virtue of the impulse noise associated with the discharge of firearms. The fourth cause of action alleges that defendant’s shooting
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property will subject the owner to gun-neutral regulations like
noise-control ordinances. Violation of those laws can support a
finding of nuisance liability,141 just as compliance with them can
serve as a strong defense.142
Nuisance liability is determined through a multifactor test
that considers, among other things, the severity of the harm, the
social utility of the activity, whether the plaintiff came to the
nuisance, and what activities are considered reasonable for the
particular area at issue.143 Generalizations about such multifactor tests are difficult. One obvious implication, though, is that
social practices and understandings—in this context, those that
are shaped by cultural battles over the appropriate use of
guns—will have a direct impact on the laws that incidentally
burden guns, for the simple reason that whether an activity is
reasonable or socially useful depends in part on the baseline
norms concerning that activity.144
3. Covenants.
The law of servitudes can also burden firearm possession
and use. Real estate covenants are written, legally enforceable
agreements that require property owners to do or not do certain
things.145 They are often found in deeds, especially in commoninterest communities like condominiums and housing subdivisions. Scholars have noted the extent to which such communities

range constitutes a public and private nuisance as the result of the discharge of
lead shot into the air and land.
141 See, for example, Kitsap County v Kitsap Rifle and Revolver Club, 337 P3d 328,
344 (Wash App 2014) (holding that increased noise levels and unsafe conditions at a
shooting range constituted a public nuisance).
142 See, for example, Concerned Citizens of Cedar Heights, 755 NYS2d at 193 (dismissing a public nuisance claim in part because the defendant, who operated a shooting
range, “submitted proof that, at the time of the commencement of the action, it was in
compliance with the noise control ordinance of the Town of DeWitt”).
143 See Singer, et al, Property Law at 346–49 (cited in note 122).
144 Consider the fact that in recent years some states have come to treat secondhand
smoke as a negative externality that might be sufficient to support a nuisance claim.
See, for example, Utah Code Ann § 78B-6-1101(3).
145 Public housing regulations are conceptually similar, but the state actions in
those scenarios are clear, and so we hold them aside here. See, for example, Doe v Wilmington Housing Authority, 880 F Supp 2d 513, 537 (D Del 2012) (finding that lease provisions that prohibited the carrying of firearms in common areas of public housing did
not violate the residents’ Second Amendment rights); Lincoln Park Housing Commission
v Andrew, 2004 WL 576260, *1–2 (Mich App) (finding that the Second Amendment was
unsuccessfully invoked to challenge a lease provision prohibiting the possession of guns
in government-subsidized housing).
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have become akin to “private governments,”146 exercising the
kind of regulatory authority that is typically associated with
state actors.147 Many of these communities use this authority to
restrict guns or ban them altogether.148
In one sense, such covenants are a classic example of private
ordering. People are free to choose the arrangements that best
suit them and reject the agreements that do not, just as they
would with a standard contract. On this reading, there should be
no problem with covenants restricting or banning guns. People
who want to live in gun-free neighborhoods can choose to do so,
just as they can choose to live in communities with uniform setbacks, a defined color palette, restrictions on aboveground sprinklers, or any of the other home-related restrictions that are the
bread and butter of covenant law. People who wish to have guns
at home can simply find other places to live.
The reach of covenant law is broad, but it does have some limits. The law disfavors—and in some cases forbids—covenants that
violate public policy or that burden certain fundamental rights.149
The most famous example is Shelley v Kraemer,150 in which the
Court found that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.151 Even holding aside
the applicability of the Constitution (an issue addressed in more
detail below152), one might argue that gun-restrictive covenants
should be unenforceable on public policy grounds.153 As of 2013,
146 See generally, for example, Stephen E. Barton and Carol J. Silverman, eds,
Common Interest Communities: Private Governments and the Public Interest (Institute of
Governmental Studies 1994).
147 See Miller, 86 NYU L Rev at 954 (cited in note 126) (“A home buyer who covenants not to possess firearms is a respectful neighbor; a village of private covenants not
to possess firearms is a zoning regulation.”).
148 See, for example, Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20
U Fla J L & Pub Pol 479, 526 (2009) (noting that most homeowners’ associations (HOAs)
“reportedly hold restrictions against firearms in homes”).
149 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.1 (2000).
150 334 US 1 (1948).
151 Id at 19–20. See also Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Association v Khan, 46
A3d 507, 522 (NJ 2012) (finding that an HOA rule banning all signs other than “for sale”
signs violated the state constitution).
152 See Part II.
153 Compare Guaranty Realty Co v Recreation Gun Club, 107 P 625, 627–28 (Cal
App 1910) (involving a failed effort to invoke the right to bear arms against a restrictive
covenant), with John-Patrick Fritz, Comment, Check Your Rights and Your Guns at the
Door: Questioning the Validity of Restrictive Covenants against the Right to Bear Arms,
35 Sw U L Rev 551, 576 (2007) (arguing that “courts should invalidate restrictive covenants that completely ban firearms in the home as violating constitutional rights and
good public policy”).
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the issue apparently had not been litigated,154 and the few commentators to address it have generally concluded that such covenants would be upheld.155
D. Why It Matters
The foregoing list is only a partial account of the ways in
which law imposes incidental burdens on the right to keep and
bear arms. Such burdens also arise in areas as diverse as employment law156 and zoning.157 The breadth and diversity of this
regulatory environment demonstrate that gun regulation is surprisingly pervasive. This does not mean that gun-related activities are burdened by incidental regulations to the same degree
or in the same manner as speech,158 nor that constitutional challenges to such regulations would or should succeed. What this
account does show is that common law, statutory law, incidental
burdens, and gun-related activities are deeply interwoven in dynamic and unacknowledged ways and that this relationship has
important practical, political, and theoretical implications.
First, a great deal of gun regulation happens outside the
glare of the gun control debate, and a full discussion of the regulatory landscape must account for that fact. For supporters of

154 See, for example, Christopher J. Wahl, Keeping Heller Out of the Home: Homeowners Associations and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 U Pa J Const L 1003, 1003 (2013).
155 See, for example, Boudreaux, 20 U Fla J L & Pub Pol at 526 (cited in note 148);
Wahl, 15 U Pa J Const L at 1036 (cited in note 154) (“Time will tell how far the looming
penumbra of Heller will reach, but for now the narrow slice of our legal system occupied
by HOAs remains fertile soil on which to experiment with limits on our right to keep and
bear arms.”).
156 Plaintiffs occasionally invoke the right to bear arms in the course of challenging
a termination of employment. See Perry v State Civil Service Commission, 38 A3d 942,
954–55 (Pa Commw 2011) (involving an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a termination
by raising the right to bear arms as a defense); Winters v Concentra Health Services, Inc,
2008 WL 803134, *4–5 (Conn Super) (same); Bastible v Weyerhaeuser Co, 437 F3d 999,
1004–08 (10th Cir 2006) (same); Hansen v America Online, Inc, 96 P3d 950, 953 (Utah
2004) (same). But see Mitchell v University of Kentucky, 366 SW3d 895, 903 (Ky 2012)
(finding that an employee’s termination based on firearm possession at work was contrary to the right to bear arms).
157 The most prominent gun-zoning case involved a direct rather than an incidental
burden, but the issue could easily arise under a “neutral” zoning regulation. See Ezell v
City of Chicago, 651 F3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir 2011) (invalidating a law that required
gun owners to spend one hour at a gun range but also prohibited the construction of such
ranges within city limits).
158 See Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech
and Free Speech Theory, 44 Hastings L J 921, 933 (1993) (“The entire corpus juris, from
the general common law of contracts, property, and torts to the most particular tax regulation, affects what gets said, by whom, to whom, and to what effect.”).
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gun control frustrated by what they see as a lack of political will,
the forms of liability discussed above are tried-and-true legal
tools that can be used to regulate the possession and use of guns
while perhaps avoiding the negative political connotations of
“gun control.” For supporters of gun rights, the enumeration of
these rules might be a cause for alarm and a reason to support
progun legislation that would abrogate the traditional rules and
expand legal immunity for gun owners.
Second, many of these rules—property and tort laws, for example—provide the basis for legally enforceable private ordering
with regard to guns. In law and economics terms, the rules put
one person in the position of either paying to stop a gun-related
activity, paying to permit a gun-related activity, or paying for
the consequence of some gun-related activity. Such “private gun
control,” enforced through civil suits rather than through criminal sanctions, raises novel and important issues for the Second
Amendment and for the gun debate more generally. By minimizing the government’s role, it lays bare the ways in which interests in gun possession interact with other important private interests like personal safety or compensation for injury.
Third, and relatedly, these incidental burdens are likely to
be especially important in jurisdictions where courts and legislatures have eliminated traditional gun control. The rollback of
state gun control laws magnifies the significance of private ordering, as individuals fill the regulatory void by negotiating with
one another regarding guns and their use. These negotiations, in
turn, occur against a background of sometimes-conflicting legal
entitlements—exclusion versus reasonable access, quiet enjoyment versus free use of property, and so on. Gun control of this
type is an inevitable part of the legal landscape and raises difficult questions of common and statutory law.
Fourth, the nature of the gun-neutral regulations discussed here helps demonstrate the baseline-shifting effect of
the progun laws that some states have recently adopted. Even
age-old common-law principles like negligence and the right to
exclude must be read in conjunction with contemporary statutes.
And some of those statutes have a major impact, either by granting outright statutory immunity to traditional rules159 or by
changing the warp and woof of common-law principles. Georgia’s
recent “carry anywhere” law, for example, appears to limit private

159

See generally, for example, PLCAA, 119 Stat 2095.
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business owners’ rights to exclude guns.160 States that preempt
local gun-safety measures (for example, municipal prohibitions
on guns in public parks) might thereby undermine torts that are
predicated on a duty that tracks the abrogated local regulation
(for example, a duty to keep firearms away from places where
children congregate).
Fifth, while the breadth of incidental burdens on the ability
to keep and bear arms may be substantial, many of the generally applicable laws discussed here contain their own safety valves
that might be used to shield gun-related activities without resort
to the Second Amendment. The reasonable-access requirement
limits the right to exclude, for example, and self-defense law
could do the same for assault. The basic canons of constitutional
avoidance161 and respect for the common law162 suggest that
courts should avail themselves of these tools when possible.
Sixth, many of the incidental burdens discussed here incorporate community standards and social practices, thereby
providing a method by which popular understandings become
legal rules. Nuisance law, for instance, takes account of what
kinds of activities are appropriate and reasonable in a given context and hence permits different kinds of gun usage in different
areas. For example, backyard target practice might constitute a
nuisance in the suburbs but not in the country. The legal standard for IIED, too, incorporates an objective inquiry into the reasonableness of the plaintiff ’s asserted harm. As a result, it inevitably depends on popular views—which vary from place to
place—about appropriate gun usage. This kind of local tailoring
is not only constitutionally permissible but is in some cases
normatively desirable.163
Finally, our hope is to help reframe the gun debate away
from its narrow focus on gun control and toward a broader evaluation of the regulation of gun-related activities. Although much
of our analysis will probably appeal to gun-rights supporters,
160

Safe Carry Protection Act, 1 Ga Laws 601 (2014).
See Clark v Martinez, 543 US 371, 380–81 (2005) (“[W]hen deciding which of two
plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems,
the other should prevail.”).
162 See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U Chi L
Rev 782, 792–95 (1986) (criticizing the development of the “actual malice” rule and arguing for a return to the common law of libel and strict liability).
163 See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L J 82, 133 (2013) (arguing that
Second Amendment doctrine “can and should be tailored to better reflect the urban/rural
divide”).
161
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this theme in particular should also interest gun control advocates. Neutral background norms concerning firearms are the
rule, not the exception. By highlighting the ubiquity of wellestablished gun-neutral doctrines from various areas of law, this
Article helps break through what appears to be a pathological
legislative dysfunction arising when any regulation, no matter
how popular or long-standing, is labeled “gun control.”
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The story of the Second Amendment is, increasingly, a story
of its boundaries.164 Heller and the two-part test that predominates in the courts of appeals rely heavily on threshold determinations about which arms, people, and activities are constitutionally covered.165 What Professor Frederick Schauer has said of
the First Amendment is therefore equally true of the Second
Amendment: “[Q]uestions about the involvement of the [ ]
Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection
that the [ ] Amendment affords the [activities] to which it applies.”166 Indeed, such threshold inquires appear increasingly
important throughout constitutional rights law, as many of the
justices express a preference for categorical tests rather than for
the familiar tiers of scrutiny.167
One way to identify a constitutional right’s boundaries is by
reference to the kinds of burdens on individual choice that warrant constitutional scrutiny. This is a harder question than it
164 See Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1765 (cited in note 1) (“The history of the First
Amendment is the history of its boundaries.”).
165 See, for example, United States v Marzzarella, 614 F3d 85, 89 (3d Cir 2010):

As we read Heller, it suggests a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment
challenges. First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. . . . If it
does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some
form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that standard, it is
constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.
See also, for example, Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 NYU L Rev 375, 380 (2009) (noting that the Heller majority
endorsed a categorical test under which “some types of ‘Arms’ and arms-usage are protected absolutely from bans and some types of ‘Arms’ and people are excluded entirely
from constitutional coverage”).
166 Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1767 (cited in note 1).
167 See, for example, United States v Stevens, 559 US 460, 471–72 (2010) (holding
that “crush videos” and other depictions of animal cruelty are not one of the “categories
of speech . . . fully outside the protection of the First Amendment”); Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 131 S Ct 2729, 2733–35 (2011).
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might seem, because not all burdens on constitutionally enumerated activities—speech and free exercise of religion, for example—raise constitutional concerns. Some burdens, whether
direct or incidental, simply fall outside the Constitution’s scope;
they lack constitutional salience.168
In part because it is so heavily categorical,169 in part because
it is so new, and in part because it so frequently bumps up
against neutral laws of general applicability,170 the right to keep
and bear arms presents a unique opportunity to explore these
broad constitutional issues. Is the Second Amendment due for
its own version of Employment Division v Smith,171 insulating
gun-neutral regulations from constitutional review?172
This is a question about both the Second Amendment and
the boundaries of the Constitution itself. On one level, our goal
is to help judges, lawyers, and scholars determine which burdens on firearms should be subject to Second Amendment scrutiny.173 At a more general level, our project is to identify the analytic tools that are useful for demarcating the boundary between
constitutional rights and other forms of law. That border is particularly important because, given the supremacy of constitutional law over other sources of law, any intrusion by nonconstitutional law on the Constitution’s side of the border will
subject that law to constitutional scrutiny, if not invalidation.174
Indeed, disputes as to the location of this border generate a
large share of litigation over constitutional rights.

168

See generally Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev 1765 (cited in note 1).
See Blocher, 84 NYU L Rev at 405–11 (cited in note 165) (describing the
“originalist categoricalism” of the Heller majority).
170 See Part I.
171 494 US 872 (1990).
172 In Smith, the Court held that criminal laws prohibiting the use of peyote did not
violate the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Id at 878–79. As Justice
Antonin Scalia wrote: “[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Id at 879 (quotation marks omitted).
173 Providing the tools is about as specific as we can get—to apply them thoroughly
to any of the incidental burdens discussed above would require at least another article’s
worth of analysis. See, for example, Wahl, 15 U Pa J Const L at 1024–35 (cited in note
154) (exploring the constitutionality of HOA servitudes that ban handgun possession in
homes).
174 See US Const Art VI, cl 2.
169
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Direct Burdens

Some gun control laws—like some regulations of other
rights175—impose direct burdens on the keeping and bearing of
arms by targeting those activities as such. These laws are what
people typically have in mind when they refer to gun control:
regulations that specifically govern the use, possession, sale, and
manufacture of firearms. The laws challenged in Heller and
McDonald v City of Chicago, Illinois176 were unusual in their
stringency but otherwise representative of such direct regulations. Understanding the constitutional status of direct burdens
is a useful first step toward understanding the constitutional salience of incidental burdens.
As a prima facie matter, direct regulations would all seem to
be subject to the Second Amendment, no matter how minimal
the impact they impose. After all, by definition they burden
what the Constitution, by its very terms, protects: the keeping
and bearing of arms. Perhaps not all these burdens should count
as “infringing” this right, but one might think that at the very
least they should be subject to scrutiny. In other words, it seems
reasonable to think that direct burdens would be subject to Second Amendment coverage.177
As a doctrinal matter, however, courts have held to the contrary. Some direct regulations are not only constitutional but actually fall entirely outside the scope of the Second Amendment.
With regard to such uncovered forms of gun control, the
Amendment does not show up at all. Thus, a short-barreled
shotgun can be banned not because the relevant degree of scrutiny is satisfied but rather because “the Second Amendment
does not protect those weapons.”178
This kind of categoricalism is particularly pronounced in Second Amendment doctrine but is not unique to it. Some direct
regulations of what an ordinary speaker of English would describe as speech, for example, are generally not subject to any

175 See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv L Rev
1175, 1176–77 (1996) (noting that “the government sometimes singles out protected activity for disadvantageous treatment” and referring to these actions as “direct burdens”).
176 561 US 742 (2010).
177 See Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1769 (cited in note 1) (discussing how, in the
context of the First Amendment, some activities may not be prohibited but nevertheless
must pass additional scrutiny).
178 Heller, 554 US at 625.
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First Amendment scrutiny. For example, securities fraud,179
child pornography,180 and obscenity181 are usually182 not treated
as “speech” for constitutional purposes. And those exclusions, in
turn, have been explained on many different grounds, including
the low value of the speech involved,183 the weight of the government’s interest,184 and the history of the prohibition.185
The Second Amendment similarly carves out some direct
regulations from constitutional coverage, and it does so (or at
least claims to do so) primarily based on whether the regulations
are long-standing. Those with a long historical lineage—
preferably all the way to the Founding,186 though most judges
will be satisfied with less187—are exempted from Second

179 See, for example, United States Securities and Exchange Commission v Pirate
Investor LLC, 580 F3d 233, 255 (4th Cir 2009) (“Punishing fraud, whether it be common
law fraud or securities fraud, simply does not violate the First Amendment.”).
180 See, for example, New York v Ferber, 458 US 747, 764 (1982).
181 See, for example, Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973).
182 The modifier is necessary because even these categories might be able to claim
First Amendment protection if, for example, they were subject to viewpoint-discriminatory
regulation. See R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 US 377, 418 (1992):

It is true that loud speech in favor of the Republican Party can be regulated because it is loud, but not because it is pro-Republican; and it is true that the
public burning of the American flag can be regulated because it involves public
burning and not because it involves the flag.
183

See, for example, Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571–72 (1942):

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene. . . . It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
(citation omitted).
184 See, for example, Ferber, 458 US at 761 (noting that child pornography is not
subject to the Miller obscenity test because of the state’s strong interest in protecting exploited children and in prosecuting those who promote such exploitation).
185 See, for example, R.A.V., 505 US at 382–83 (noting that, “[f]rom 1791 to the present,” the United States has “permitted restrictions upon the content of speech” and that
“the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations” on, for example, obscenity, defamation, or fighting words).
186 See, for example, Ezell v City of Chicago, 651 F3d 684, 702–03 (7th Cir 2011)
(“[I]f the government can establish that a challenged firearms law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the relevant historical moment—1791 or 1868—then the analysis can stop there.”).
187 See, for example, National Rifle Association of America, Inc v Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F3d 185, 204 (5th Cir 2012) (upholding restrictions on selling firearms to eighteen-year-olds).
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Amendment scrutiny no matter how significant the burdens
they place on regulated parties.
Heller itself is exemplary in this regard. After dispensing
with the militia clause as “prefatory” and not a limit on the second, “operative” clause, the majority said that it would “start [ ]
with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is
exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.”188 Later,
however, the Court took a notable turn, concluding that some
laws, people, purposes, and weapons fall completely outside the
scope of the Second Amendment:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.189
So, despite what many gun-rights advocates urge as a clear textual command to protect all “people” and “arms” and “bearing,”
the opinion makes equally clear that some people (“felons and
the mentally ill”190), some kinds of guns (“weapons not typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”191), and
some gun-related activities (“any sort of confrontation”192) are
categorically excluded from the scope of the Amendment.
The majority suggested that these exceptions were embedded in the meaning of the text at the time it was ratified.193 But
scholars and judges, even those sympathetic to Heller’s basic
conclusion, have noted that there is scanty Founding-era support for Heller’s carveouts.194 The federal ban on possession by
felons, for example, did not exist until 1938 and did not extend

188

Heller, 554 US at 580–81.
Id at 626–27.
190 Id at 626. See also id at 644 (Stevens dissenting) (“[W]hen it finally drills down
on the substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court limits the protected
class to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”).
191 Id at 625. See also id at 627 (“[T]he sorts of weapons protected [by the Second
Amendment] were those ‘in common use at the time.’”).
192 Heller, 554 US at 595.
193 Id at 634–35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.”).
194 See, for example, Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L Rev 1343, 1357–58 (2009) (noting that there is an “absence of
historical support” for Scalia’s claim that supposedly long-standing prohibitions are consistent with the preexisting right to bear arms).
189

328

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:295

to all felons until 1968.195 Prior to 1961, there were no specific
federal prohibitions on carrying a loaded gun onto an airplane—
which is unquestionably a “sensitive place.”196 Unless courts construe Founding-era regulations at a higher level of abstraction,197 shorten the length of time for regulations to be considered long-standing, or both, few modern regulations will find
indisputable support in Founding-era law.
Nevertheless, a history-based categorical approach to direct
regulations has become an essential part of the post-Heller
analysis. In the wake of Heller, most courts have adopted a twopart test for evaluating Second Amendment claims,198 the first
part of which asks whether a particular claim falls within the
Amendment’s scope.199 That threshold inquiry into the Amendment’s boundaries is grounded in history. Long-standing regulations are categorically excluded from the Second Amendment’s
scope, although courts continue to debate the length of time and
the level of abstraction that are required for a regulation to be
considered long-standing.200
Bans on concealed carry are a good example of this kind of
analysis. Heller suggests that such regulations—which undoubtedly impose direct burdens on the keeping and bearing of arms—
are constitutional due to historical practice: “[T]he majority of the
195 See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 695, 698–99, 735 (2009). See also Lund, 56 UCLA L Rev at 1357 n 33 (cited in
note 194) (“Even limited bans on the possession of concealable weapons by violent felons
were apparently not adopted until well into the twentieth century.”).
196 Act of Sept 5, 1961, Pub L No 87-197, 75 Stat 466.
197 The Court has already engaged in this level-of-abstraction inquiry with regard to
the weapons that are covered by the Second Amendment. A modern nine-millimeter
handgun is materially different in operation, accuracy, and lethality than an eighteenthcentury musket, but confining the Second Amendment to only the latter, according to the
Court, would “border[ ] on the frivolous.” Heller, 554 US at 582.
198 See, for example, United States v Greeno, 679 F3d 510, 518 (6th Cir 2012); Heller
v District of Columbia, 670 F3d 1244, 1252–53 (DC Cir 2011); Ezell, 651 F3d at 701–04;
United States v Chester, 628 F3d 673, 680 (4th Cir 2010); United States v Reese, 627 F3d
792, 800–01 (10th Cir 2010); Marzzarella, 614 F3d at 89.
199 If that threshold question is answered in the affirmative, then the second part of
the test asks whether the challenged regulation can be justified in light of the burden
that it imposes on protected conduct—an inquiry that is largely guided by interest balancing, which is discussed below.
200 Compare National Rifle Association, 700 F3d at 206 (noting that “categorically
restricting the presumptive Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds does not violate the central concern of the Second Amendment” because such restrictions are analogous to regulations on firearms in the hands of the mentally ill and felons), with National Rifle Association, Inc v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 714 F3d
334, 339 (5th Cir 2013) (Jones dissenting from denial of hearing en banc) (criticizing
“[t]he panel’s resort to generalized history” to uphold the regulation).
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19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”201 Lower courts facing
challenges to concealed-carry regulations have overwhelmingly
agreed, holding that such prohibitions are so well entrenched
that they are not subject to scrutiny of any kind. On this reading, concealed carrying simply does not constitute keeping or
bearing arms for Second Amendment purposes.
Although Heller and the two-part test both emphasize history in exempting direct regulations from constitutional scrutiny,
it seems likely that some form of prudentialism or interest balancing plays a role, even if only implicitly.202 Although the Court
has recently tried to suggest otherwise, First Amendment jurisprudence has often employed interest balancing when defining
the boundaries of free speech.203 Categories like child pornography, for example, are often said to fall outside the scope of the
First Amendment in part because they are so harmful and worth
so little.204 It is not hard to imagine that the same kind of reasoning lies behind intuitions and judicial decisions that exclude
from Second Amendment coverage certain arms that have the
potential to inflict indiscriminate carnage and that are “of such
slight social value as a step to” self-defense that banning them
need not satisfy even low levels of constitutional scrutiny.205
201 Heller, 554 US at 626 (providing an example of the historically limited nature of
the Second Amendment right).
202 This, too, is a common practice in constitutional rights law. See generally Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Post-liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U Colo
L Rev 293 (1992).
203 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 Cal L Rev 935, 938–39
(1968) (describing the Court’s practice of “ad hoc balancing” of competing interests in
First Amendment jurisprudence). See also Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value
Speech, 128 Harv L Rev 2166, 2197–2211 (2015) (challenging the historical claims that
the Court has recently made to support its exclusions of low-value speech).
204 See, for example, Ferber, 458 US at 762 (“The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”). In recent cases, the Court has characterized the
First Amendment’s exemptions as being grounded in history rather than in cost-benefit
analysis. See, for example, Stevens, 559 US at 471. This seems, at the very least, to represent a substantial shift in the Court’s jurisprudence. See Randy J. Kozel, Second
Thoughts about the First Amendment *3–4 (unpublished manuscript, Jan 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BH24-SQ35.
205 Chaplinsky, 315 US at 572 (noting that lewd and obscene utterances are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality”). Heller suggests that the constitutionality of these bans is rooted in
tradition. Heller, 554 US at 627 (concluding that Miller’s limitations are supported by the
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However the courts come to construct the categories—
whether from historical lineage, analogical reasoning from historical precedent, or interest balancing—the point is that some
direct burdens on the right to keep and bear arms do not even
raise constitutional questions. Prohibitions on concealed carrying or possession by felons, for example, impose burdens that
are both direct and, for the people they reach, quite significant.
But Second Amendment challenges to those prohibitions founder
at the threshold. Despite the directness or severity of the burdens they impose, such laws are exempt from constitutional
scrutiny.
B.

Incidental Burdens

As described above, Second Amendment doctrine has developed rules for determining the constitutional salience of direct
burdens on the right to keep and bear arms. But as of yet, courts
have identified few tools to determine when incidental burdens
raise Second Amendment concerns. Supplying those tools is an
increasingly unavoidable task. Prior to Heller, some gun owners
and manufacturers challenged incidental burdens on Second
Amendment grounds. These challenges largely failed.206 But after Heller, such claims cannot be so easily dismissed. And as a
practical matter, they are likely to arise more often in jurisdictions where courts and legislatures have rolled back—for political or constitutional reasons—conventional forms of gun control.
When direct regulations are stripped away, the underlying
structure of incidental burdens becomes more relevant. When
public carrying is decriminalized, for example, courts are more
likely to face the question of when publicly carrying a firearm is
a public nuisance or a disturbance of the peace.
Such questions are new to the Second Amendment but not
to constitutional law. Religious exercise and free expression, for
example, often encounter incidental legal burdens, raising the
questions of when and how those burdens are subject to First

“historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons”)
(quotation marks omitted).
206 See, for example, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v
AcuSport, Inc, 271 F Supp 2d 435, 462 (EDNY 2003) (“There is no justification in the
federal Constitution for private persons failing to exercise reasonable care in meeting
their legal responsibility to help ensure a safe society.”); City of Gary, Indiana v Smith &
Wesson Corp, 801 NE2d 1222, 1235 (Ind 2003) (finding that state constitutional protection of the right to keep and bear arms did not bar a suit for nuisance).
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Amendment scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s efforts to mediate
these encounters between constitutional and nonconstitutional
law have created well-known and in some cases quite controversial doctrines, from Smith207 to Marsh v Alabama.208
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, especially the law of regulatory takings, also provides lessons on how incidental burdens
can implicate constitutional rights. In takings doctrine, courts
are required to determine when a regulation that is not specifically designed to take private property should nonetheless be
treated as having done so. The Supreme Court has recognized
that “[g]overnment hardly could go on” if every burden on property rights constituted a taking,209 but it has also noted that
burdens can sometimes go “too far.”210 To identify the situations
in which constitutional rules must apply, the Court has combined bright-line rules and interest balancing, just as lower
courts have done with regard to gun rights. Thus, for example,
any permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a regulatory taking no matter how minor the cost,211 and any total deprivation of a property’s value counts as a taking no matter how
strong the government’s interest.212 In addition to those brightline rules, courts also consider a regulation’s cost, interference
with “investment-backed expectations,” and “character.”213
We do not attempt here to synthesize the rules regarding religious exercise, freedom of expression, and takings into a
transsubstantive approach for evaluating the constitutional salience of incidental burdens.214 Instead, our aim is to look to those
rules for guidance on similar questions surrounding the keeping
and bearing of arms.215 Drawing on lessons from other constitutional rights, we identify four main forms of argument that are
relevant to the question whether a given incidental burden
should be subject to heightened scrutiny. These modalities are
207 Smith, 494 US at 874, 882–84 (demonstrating the tension between eligibility for
state unemployment compensation and free exercise of religion).
208 326 US 501, 503–04 (1946) (addressing the tension between a state antitrespass
statute and the free exercise of religion).
209 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922).
210 Id at 415.
211 See Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 US 419, 426 (1982).
212 See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015–16 (1992).
213 Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 124 (1978).
214 For the leading effort along these lines, see generally Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev 1175
(cited in note 175).
215 See generally Nelson Tebbe and Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108
Mich L Rev 459 (2010).
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tools with which judges, lawyers, and scholars can determine
whether a particular burden raises constitutional concerns.
The first of these argumentative forms is history and tradition. As noted above, certain long-standing direct burdens on
guns are exempt from constitutional scrutiny, and the same
should be true for long-standing incidental burdens.216 A reliance
on tradition helps explain why, for example, the right to keep
and bear arms is not violated by the equally fundamental and
long-standing right to exclude an unwanted visitor from one’s
private property. The latter right is, as one court recently put it,
part of the “canvas” on which the Second Amendment was
painted.217
The second argument focuses on the consequences of the
burden. Laws that impose substantial incidental burdens should
be subject to scrutiny, but laws that impose minor incidental
burdens should not. This is essentially the approach that Professor Michael Dorf advocates with regard to incidental burdens on
the fundamental rights to free speech, free exercise, and equal
protection,218 and it translates well to the context of guns.
The third approach also focuses on consequences but for the
system as a whole rather than for the individual. Applying Second Amendment scrutiny to neutral laws like trespass, assault,
and negligence raises serious structural questions about state
action, federalism, and the proper role of courts. When adjudication threatens to disrupt these settled matters of institutional
design, courts should be more hesitant to apply Second Amendment scrutiny.
The fourth consideration is the purpose or design of the regulation. Some burdens, though nominally incidental, operate like
direct regulations and should be treated as such. Some regulations might be facially gun neutral but intended to deter gunrelated activities—the replacement of DC’s safe-storage law with a
substantively identical negligence standard is an example.219 Similarly, some gun-neutral legal rules—for example, those that are
more punitive than compensatory—might serve public interests

216
217
218
219

See notes 186–89, 200, and accompanying text.
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc v Georgia, 687 F3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir 2012).
See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1223–33 (cited in note 175).
DC Code § 7-2507.02
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rather than interests in private ordering or restorative justice.220
Such regulatory torts are more likely to implicate the Constitution.
As in other areas of law, these factors interact in complicated ways. An incidental burden’s provenance might well trump
the significance of its impact on individuals, just as a direct burden’s longevity can exempt it from constitutional scrutiny even if
it amounts to a complete prohibition on gun possession (felon-inpossession statutes, for example). Through repeated application,
some factors might calcify into rules. Just as a permanent physical invasion constitutes a per se regulatory taking, so too the abrogation of a necessity defense to a trespass action might constitute a per se Second Amendment violation. Nevertheless, the
basic proposition bears repeating: the fact that an incidental
burden warrants Second Amendment scrutiny says very little
about whether the incidental burden actually violates the Second Amendment. These tools of analysis simply help a court assess whether the Second Amendment should even apply to the
incidental burden under consideration.
1. Text, history, and long-standing incidental burdens.
In answering any constitutional question, the standard
place to begin is with the text of the document.221 And, more often than not, the meaning of that text is created, informed, or
demonstrated by history.222 Reliance on text and history is therefore among the most fundamental tools in constitutional analysis223 and currently plays a particularly prominent role in Second
220 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 Georgetown L J 513,
518–24 (2003).
221 See, for example, City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 519 (1997) (stating that
when interpreting the Constitution, “we begin with its text”). See also Joseph Story, 1
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a Preliminary Review of the
Constitutional Histories of the Colonies and States before the Adoption of the Constitution
§ 451 at 345 (Little, Brown 5th ed 1891) (Melville M. Bigelow, ed):

Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for
the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. . . . The people
make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them,
with the help of common-sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any
recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss.
222 See Eugene Volokh, Textualism and District of Columbia v. Heller, 37 Harv J L
& Pub Pol 729, 730 (2014) (“To the extent that you’re going to be a textualist, you ought
to be an originalist.”).
223 Professor Bobbitt treats text and history as distinct modalities. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution at 7–8 (cited in note 32). We certainly have no
quarrel with that distinction as a conceptual matter, particularly for textual provisions
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Amendment doctrine.224 These same tools can provide some
guidance—but rarely a clear answer225—as to the specific question whether incidental burdens should be subject to constitutional scrutiny.
The text of the Second Amendment says that the right to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Founding-era dictionaries, assuming that they are reliable226 or even relevant,227
define “infringe” as “to violate, intrude, or invade the property or
privilege of another.”228 The notion of “infringement” seems to
assume some kind of boundary and can be thought of as binary:
either a regulation infringes on a right or it does not. There are
no partial infringements. Textually, “infringe” appears to mean
something different than, for example, “abridge,” which (again,
assuming reliability and relevance) means “to contract, diminish, or cut short.”229
Applying this textual analysis to incidental burdens on the
keeping and bearing of arms seems straightforward: As with direct burdens, incidental burdens—either accepted by the
Amendment’s text or well established in history—should be exempt from constitutional scrutiny. In other words, the boundaries

whose language is relatively clear to the average person on the street. But in the particular context of the Second Amendment, text and history are almost impossible to separate. Heller itself is often described as the Court’s most thoroughgoing originalist opinion, and yet the majority structures its entire opinion around the text of the Amendment.
See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Georgetown L J 657, 659 (2009).
224 See generally Miller, 122 Yale L J 852 (cited in note 30).
225 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1179 (cited in note 175).
226 See Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 Yale J L & Humanities 295, 298 (2011) (stating that early dictionaries “were idiosyncratic products of their
authors, who often had ideological and political agendas”); Phillip A. Rubin, Note, War of
the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60
Duke L J 167, 192–93 (2010).
227 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier and Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress:
The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94
Marq L Rev 77, 80 (2010) (“Unlike other points of reference for interpreting words and
phrases—such as context, the stated or implied purpose of a phrase or enactment, drafts,
legislative history, or other documents—dictionary definitions provide no context for the
word or phrase being defined.”).
228 D. Bellamy, et al, A New Complete English Dictionary at “infringe” (printed for
Fuller 2d ed 1760).
229 Id at “abridge.” See also US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”). The utility of this linguistic exercise is debatable.
Some state Second Amendment analogues specify that the right to keep and bear arms
“shall not be questioned.” Pa Const Art I, § 21. However, that appears to create either a
nonjusticiable political question or an immunity from scrutiny that no constitution in a
system with judicial review can tolerate.
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of the Amendment’s text conform to the features of the commonlaw and statutory norms that existed at the time of the Founding, or to other features that have arisen from long use over
time. If liability for negligence with a weapon, taxes on ammunition, or storage requirements for weapons are historically indicated, then they cannot be “infringements,” because there is no
corresponding right. From an originalist perspective, one might
say that these incidental burdens were embedded in the meaning of the text at the time that it was ratified, just as other constitutional rights are “enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.”230 This does not
mean, however, that the precise contours of those burdens must
be frozen in the late 1700s—it is perfectly coherent to say that the
Second Amendment, as ratified, not only exempted negligence
from coverage but also left to future courts (and perhaps even legislatures) the power to change the definition of negligence.231
Although the Second Amendment appears unique in the degree of importance that it places on text and history,232 many constitutional rights are defined at the margins by long-standing
practice.233 For example, courts look to history to determine
whether a given incidental burden raises constitutional problems.234 A key Fifth Amendment takings case, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council235 (authored, like Heller, by Scalia), holds
that even total deprivation of a property’s value is not a regulatory taking if the common law would have defined the property usage as a nuisance.236 In that scenario, there is no property for the
government to take. Though there are important differences, the
structure of this analysis is worth emphasizing: even if a wellestablished background rule—an incidental burden, in other
words—were to fully deprive a person of what he may consider
his property, it would nonetheless be exempt from constitutional
230

Heller, 554 US at 634–35.
See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 1813,
1819–54 (2012); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi
L Rev 877, 879 (1996) (describing, inter alia, “the rational traditionalism that is the most
important part of common law constitutional interpretation”).
232 The Seventh Amendment is probably the closest competitor in this regard. See
Miller, 122 Yale L J at 872 (cited in note 30).
233 See Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”) (quotation marks omitted).
234 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1186–87 (cited in note 175).
235 505 US 1003 (1992).
236 Id at 1029.
231
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scrutiny because the burden would not be a taking of property
as the Constitution uses those terms.
The same is likely true in the Second Amendment context, in
which the history and boundaries of the Second Amendment appear to be mutually constitutive. Sometimes the implications are
straightforward enough. Rules against negligence, trespass, and
nuisance are as traditional and long-standing as any legal prohibitions can be.237 Therefore, like analogous direct burdens, they
should be strongly insulated from constitutional scrutiny and also
insulated from facial challenges. Of course, in a given case, even
these rules might impose such a burden238 or be applied in such a
fashion239 as to give rise to an as-applied challenge.
Consider a concrete illustration. In a recent case involving a
Second Amendment challenge to the ability of churches to exclude armed parishioners, the Eleventh Circuit explained that
“property law, tort law, and criminal law provide the canvas on
which our Founding Fathers drafted the Second Amendment.”240
The court held that “[a] clear grasp of this background illustrates that the pre-existing right codified in the Second Amendment does not include protection for a right to carry a firearm in
a place of worship against the owner’s wishes.”241 This is a
straightforward application of the principle that traditional incidental burdens—imposed through “property law, tort law, and
criminal law”—are not subject to Second Amendment scrutiny.242
This is not to say that the question will always be straightforward or the answer easy to explain. Why are property and
tort the canvas for the Second Amendment and not the other
way around? Both are undoubtedly fundamental, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized,243 and it is hard to say—at least given
the logic of Heller—that one or the other is more deeply rooted in

237 See Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at 163–68 (cited in note 60) (discussing trespass); id at 169–73 (discussing nuisance); William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the
Laws of England 331–32 (Cavendish 2001) (Wayne Morrison, ed) (originally published
1765) (discussing a master’s duty to answer for his servant’s negligence).
238 See Part II.B.2.
239 See Part II.B.4.
240 GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F3d at 1264.
241 Id.
242 Id. The court had no cause to consider whether a prosecution for running into a
church with a firearm to defend individuals under attack would be unconstitutional.
That kind of self-defense exception is as much built into the as-applied challenge as is a
felon picking up a pistol in an emergency.
243 See id.
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the American constitutional system. A great deal turns on the
framing issue, and it often goes unexplained.
One of the dissents in Heller, for example, pointed out that
safety regulations in major colonial cities like Boston and
Philadelphia prohibited people from storing gunpowder in their
homes or from carrying loaded firearms into houses, stores,
shops, stables, or barns.244 This dissent held out these regulations as solid evidence that DC’s safe-storage requirement
should be upheld, or that it at least should be read to incorporate a self-defense exception.245 But the majority demurred, concluding that the historical regulations were isolated and minor
in their severity (“akin to . . . speeding or jaywalking”) and, in
any event, that they “would [not] be enforced” against someone
violating the statute in self-defense.246 What can explain the difference? Why is property law part of the canvas on which the
Second Amendment was drafted, but the gunpowder regulations
are not? Similarly, why was self-defense assumed to be part of
the canvas for the colonial gunpowder restrictions but not for
DC’s safe-storage law?247
Consider, too, Heller’s treatment of the phrase “right of the
people.” As noted above, the majority suggests that the phrase includes “all Americans,”248 but “when it finally drills down on the
substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court limits
the protected class to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”249 Heller
is not unique in this regard. Justices, judges, scholars, lawyers,
and politicians often transform the Amendment’s phrase “the

244 Heller, 554 US at 684–85 (Breyer dissenting). Whether gunpowder-storage regulations are incidental or direct burdens on the right to keep and bear arms is debatable,
but the point is the same either way.
245 Id at 692 (Breyer dissenting).
246 Id at 633–34.
247 See id at 692 (Breyer dissenting) (“I am puzzled by the majority’s unwillingness
to adopt a similar approach. It readily reads unspoken self-defense exceptions into every
colonial law, but it refuses to accept the District’s concession that this law has one.”).
248 Heller, 554 US at 581.
249 Id at 644 (Stevens dissenting). See also id at 625 (“[T]he Second Amendment
does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes.”).
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people” into “law-abiding citizens,”250 just as they slip in the
word “lawful” before “Arms.”251
This raises a fundamental question: What is the law that
one must abide by in order to fall within the scope of the Second
Amendment? It seems unlikely that the answer is gun control
law itself—after all, the point of a Second Amendment challenge
is to say that such laws are not constitutionally lawful. Rather,
it seems that “law-abiding citizens” are worthy of Second
Amendment coverage because they abide by other laws—
regulations that do not target guns as such. Those who fail to
abide by such laws are not law-abiding and are therefore not
“the people” who fall within the Amendment’s scope.
This means that these gun-neutral laws impose incidental
burdens on the Second Amendment—indeed, they define the
very scope of Second Amendment rights. Consider a person convicted of a non-gun-related felony like securities fraud. Federal
law forbids him to own a firearm.252 The latter of these prohibitions is, on its face, a direct regulation of the right to keep and
bear arms, but not as it applies to him. The logic of Heller is not
that the latter regulation survives scrutiny because of his earlier
conviction, but rather that no scrutiny applies because the felony conviction for securities fraud removes him from the ambit of
constitutional coverage. The regulation’s impact on the right to
keep and bear arms is significant but incidental. One can do the
same exercise for any class of people—for example, felons,253 the
mentally ill,254 and undocumented immigrants (at least in one
circuit)255—who are denied the right to keep and bear arms on
the basis of a gun-neutral legal status.

250 See, for example, Jake Miller, Ted Cruz Talks Guns, Same-Sex Marriage,
Obamacare with Jay Leno (CBS News, Nov 9, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/XQV3
-HDJW (quoting Senator Ted Cruz as arguing that Congress should increase the resources devoted to prosecuting violations rather than “try to take away the constitutional
rights of law-abiding citizens”).
251 See, for example, Norman v State, 159 S3d 205, 214 (Fla App 2015) (discussing
whether “the Legislature may [ ] impose some restrictions and conditions on either the
method or manner that lawful arms may be carried outside the home”).
252 See Marshall, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 695 (cited in note 195).
253 See Heller, 554 US at 626.
254 See id.
255 See United States v Portillo-Munoz, 643 F3d 437, 442 (5th Cir 2011) (finding that
an undocumented immigrant does not have Second Amendment rights). But see Britt v
State, 681 SE2d 320, 322–23 (NC 2009) (upholding an as-applied challenge to a felon-inpossession statute brought under a state analogue to the Second Amendment).
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In such cases, facially gun-neutral laws have a massive impact on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms256 and yet
are not subject to constitutional scrutiny. In fact, they are the
very reason that such scrutiny does not apply. This seems to run
counter to the approach, described by Dorf and others, suggesting that incidental burdens on constitutional rights should be
subject to heightened scrutiny when they impose significant
burdens on protected conduct. How can law have such a fundamental practical impact on the Second Amendment’s scope and
yet be immune from Second Amendment scrutiny? How can neutral laws escape constitutional review when defining a right but
not when burdening it?
The answer lies in part with normative and interpretive
commitments regarding the value of tradition. Incidental burdens could be insulated from constitutional review precisely because they are traditional257 or perhaps because the Constitution’s text or original meaning compels as much.258 Burkean
judges might preserve incidental burdens because the burdens
are likely to reflect shared wisdom or because of the costs of
change—to avoid disrupting a long-standing web of incidental
regulations, courts might simply determine (perhaps sub silentio) that those regulations or the activities they reach simply fall
outside the text of the Second Amendment.
In addition to these general interpretive considerations, one
must also account for the Second Amendment itself. As discussed in Part III, it is here that the necessity of Second
Amendment theory becomes apparent, for there is no way to determine what counts as a “canvas” without some prior determination about perspective. That framing will inevitably be driven
in large part by a normative vision of the Second Amendment.
That the Amendment denies coverage to felons, for example, reflects a law-and-order approach to its purpose.259 And when
courts parse this category of felons, separating some from the

256 That scope becomes relevant only when a gun regulation—a ban on possession by
felons, for example—is put into place, but it is not the ban itself that defines the scope.
257 See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L J
1029 (1990).
258 See Sachs, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1828–37 (cited in note 231).
259 See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 Harv L Rev 191, 207–11 (2008).
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overall felon carveout, they do so with an eye toward other Second Amendment values.260
2. Individual consequences of the burden: significance.
Another way to evaluate the constitutional salience of an incidental burden is by reference to the size of its imposition on
the keeping and bearing of arms. Incidental burdens that are
relatively insignificant should not be subject to constitutional
scrutiny. Those that are significant burdens should be, though of
course they might still survive that scrutiny.
In his insightful article about incidental burdens on fundamental rights, Dorf makes this significance inquiry the touchstone of analysis. The particular rights he studies are free exercise, free speech, and equal protection, and his conclusion with
regard to all of them is that “laws having the incidental effect of
substantially burdening fundamental rights to engage in primary conduct should be subject to heightened scrutiny.”261 The
same inquiry appears in other areas of constitutional rights law.
A basic principle of regulatory takings law, for example, is that
if a “regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”262
The size of a regulation’s economic impact is one of the most important factors in determining whether it has gone too far.263
With regard to guns, then, one might determine whether an
incidental burden goes too far by reference to the impact it has
on the activity of keeping and bearing arms. As in takings law,
this inquiry can in turn be guided by a variety of factors, including the level of generality at which one defines the activity that
is burdened, the amount of activity the incidental burden prohibits, and the theory explaining why the activity is constitutionally protected in the first place.
As Judge Jeffrey Sutton put it, “Level of generality is destiny
in interpretive disputes.”264 Whether an incidental burden appears significant or trivial depends on how narrowly or broadly
260 See, for example, United States v Moore, 666 F3d 313, 320 (4th Cir 2012); United
States v Barton, 633 F3d 168, 174 (3d Cir 2011).
261 Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1179 (cited in note 175).
262 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 US at 415.
263 Penn Central, 438 US at 124 (“The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations [in determining whether there is a taking for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment].”).
264 Thomas More Law Center v Obama, 651 F3d 529, 560 (6th Cir 2011) (Sutton
concurring).
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one defines the activity that is being burdened. In the takings
arena, courts have struggled to decide the metric that one
should use to measure whether a “total” taking has occurred—
whether, for example, to consider a regulation that affects subterranean mineral rights as a parcel separate from the surface.265 This is often described as the denominator problem.
With regard to guns, the denominator problem is analogous
and equally fraught. When does a regulation (whether direct or
indirect) constitute a ban, and when is it simply a regulation of
one aspect of gun ownership? If, for example, a municipal zoning
code or local nuisance law were to effectively forbid people from
shooting guns on their private property, courts would have to
determine whether this state of affairs were a ban on the bearing of arms at home or merely a regulation of one stick in the
bundle of rights.266
Ultimately, the most fundamental challenge is not methodological so much as it is normative. Without a clear theory of the
Second Amendment’s values, there is simply no way to characterize or measure the significance of a burden. For example, a
government regulation that completely deprives a property of
economic value is treated as a taking.267 But this rule makes
sense only because economic value is widely accepted as a relevant characteristic of property protected by the Takings
Clause—it is, in that context, the value that the law seeks to
protect. Second Amendment theory has not yet defined analogous values with sufficient specificity. As discussed in more detail below,268 the self-defense right established in Heller is capable of multiple substantive interpretations, each of which has
different implications for what burdens are considered constitutionally salient.

265

Pennsylvania Coal, 260 US at 412–13.
See Friedman v City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F3d 406, 410 (7th Cir
2015) (considering, inter alia, “whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of
self-defense”).
267 Lucas, 505 US at 1019.
268 See Part III.
266
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3. Structural consequences of the burden: the impact of
scrutiny on the system.
A second consequentialist factor addresses the impact of a
burden on “structural” values269 rather than on the interests of individual rights holders. Under this approach, judges should avoid
constitutional scrutiny when it threatens to upset settled institutional arrangements, such as the division between public and private regulation, the distinctive role of courts, or federalism.
State-action doctrine provides that, with limited exceptions,270 constitutional provisions only apply against the government.271 One function of this doctrine is to preserve a private
sphere in which individuals can govern themselves as they see
fit. Without some kind of limitation on the reach of constitutional rights—and we presume not that the state-action requirement is the ideal limitation but only that it serves this purpose—all forms of private ordering would be subject to
constitutional restrictions, perhaps reducing the scope of individual liberty.272
Though it technically applies to almost all constitutional
claims, the state-action requirement is particularly relevant to
incidental burdens imposed by private causes of action rooted in
the common law. Typically, if one private party brings a trespass
action against another, the defendant cannot raise a free speech
or equal protection defense.273 But sometimes the judicial enforcement of private rights is treated as state action. In Shelley,

269 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 Tex L Rev 695, 721 (1980) (“Structural
arguments are inferences from the existence of constitutional structures and the relationships that the Constitution ordains among the structures of government.”).
270 The Thirteenth Amendment is perhaps the most prominent example. See, for
example, Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 US 409, 438 (1968); Civil Rights Cases, 109
US 3, 20 (1883).
271 As to whether the Second Amendment has a state-action requirement, some gunrights activists seem to disagree. See The NRA Should Hold Its Fire (Bloomberg, Aug 14,
2005), archived at http://perma.cc/VH3E-GQ9U; Marquez, Employers Fire Back (cited in
note 132).
272 See Lillian BeVier and John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics,
96 Va L Rev 1767, 1822 (2010).
273 Courts have carved out exceptions to the state-action requirement when a private
party is entangled with, performing the functions of, or otherwise behaving like the government. Assuming these exceptions apply in Second Amendment cases, their reach is
quite limited. See, for example, Brentwood Academy v Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 US 288, 291 (2001) (holding that a nonprofit athletic association’s regulatory activity was state action because of the “pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association”); Nixon v Condon, 286 US 73, 84–85 (1932).
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for instance, the Court found that the Equal Protection Clause
bars judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.274
In free speech law, some of the most important and recognizable cases involve civil liability. In New York Times Co v Sullivan,275 for example, the Court quickly disposed of the argument
(endorsed by Alabama’s Supreme Court) that libel judgments
are not subject to the First Amendment:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that
law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common
law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.276
Since New York Times, the Court has repeatedly applied First
Amendment scrutiny to civil lawsuits between private parties.277
Indeed, the New York Times Court suggested that civil suits
may present a greater threat to First Amendment interests than
criminal prosecutions do, because civil suits lack procedural
safeguards such as grand jury indictments and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.278
Exploring the foundations of state-action doctrine is far beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, we assume
that some incidental burdens on gun-related activities meet the
state-action threshold: certainly those imposed by gun-neutral
statutes and regulations, and—as with free speech—some civil
rules as well. But courts should nonetheless be cautious about
applying the Second Amendment in disputes between private
parties to preserve sufficient space for private ordering and
choice. Businesses and HOAs, for example, might argue that
they should not be subjected to constitutional litigation every
time they want to exclude guns and that gun owners who wish
274 Shelley, 334 US at 20. Though never overruled, Shelley’s impact has been muted,
and even those who celebrate the result sometimes question its rightness. See Mark D.
Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 Cal L Rev
451, 457–69 (2007); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 Harv L Rev 1, 29–31 (1959).
275 376 US 254 (1964).
276 Id at 265 (citation omitted).
277 See, for example, Snyder v Phelps, 131 S Ct 1207, 1215–19 (2011); Time, Inc v
Hill, 385 US 374, 387–89 (1967).
278 New York Times, 376 US at 277–78.
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to carry guns in public can simply choose to visit other establishments.279 Again, these are arguments not about levels of
scrutiny (the safety interests of an HOA versus the interests of
traveling visitors) but rather about the burdens imposed by recognizing a constitutional claim in the first instance.
The division between state and private actions is not the only structural issue that is relevant to the prudence of constitutional scrutiny of incidental burdens. Courts might also consider
the resource demands on their dockets. As Professor Marin Levy
has shown, the Supreme Court does sometimes invoke “floodgates” concerns when defining the contours of substantive
rights.280 Such concerns seem especially pertinent in the context
of incidental burdens. Indeed, nearly all regulations impose
some incidental burdens on protected conduct, and subjecting
them all to constitutional scrutiny would be overwhelming.281
The threat is not so much that the challenges will succeed but
rather that they will generate costs and uncertainty. If every assault case involving a gun were subject to a Second Amendment
defense, courts would be clogged with constitutional claims that
would, even if weak, require attention. Much of the regulatory
state would grind to a halt if every law concerning lead, copper,
or labor were scrutinized to see what effect it has on keeping and
bearing arms, whether or not it was actually aimed at firearms
in the first place.282 Applying scrutiny generates costs; denying
protection is costlier in this regard than denying coverage.
In addition to the burdens it would place on the judiciary,
subjecting neutral laws of general applicability to heightened
scrutiny could potentially interfere with the other branches of
government. As the Court remarked when it refused to apply
heightened scrutiny to laws with racially unequal impacts, “[a]
rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid . . . if in practice it benefits or burdens one race
more than another . . . would raise serious questions about, and
279 Whether a private party may claim a Second Amendment right to designate who
may be armed on its property is a related issue. See Blocher, 64 Stan L Rev at 41–44
(cited in note 113).
280 Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U Chi L Rev 1007, 1008–
10 (2013).
281 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1199 (cited in note 175).
282 See Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control after Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L Rev 1041,
1084 (2009) (comparing regulatory-cost concerns arising after Heller to the Court’s repeated refusal to grant media operations the “constitutional immunity from labor or antitrust laws that are applicable to other businesses”).
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perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes.”283 These costs would be further compounded by federalism concerns, since many of the most
significant incidental burdens on firearms are imposed by traditional subjects of state law such as tort and property.
Advocates of broad gun rights might argue that these structural concerns are subordinate to the most important structural
principle: the Supremacy Clause.284 But with regard to incidental burdens, the relevant and difficult question is not whether the Second Amendment should trump other laws but whether
it is implicated at all. Nothing in Article VI answers that critical
question.
4. Character of the burden: purpose and design.
A fourth way to consider whether the Second Amendment
should apply to an incidental burden on guns is by asking
whether the law imposing the burden operates like gun control.
When a supposedly incidental burden is in fact directed at protected conduct, it is more properly a subject of constitutional
scrutiny, if not necessarily of constitutional invalidation.
This inquiry is not quite as circular as it might sound.
Courts and scholars must often address whether common-law
claims should be treated as a kind of public regulation for the
purposes of state-action doctrine. Sometimes their answer has
been yes, as in New York Times and Shelley. Similarly, the imposition of damages by a jury might appear to be simple restorative justice between parties, but in BMW of North America, Inc v
Gore,285 the Court held, inter alia, that the deterrence function of
a punitive award transformed private justice into government
regulation that was subject to due process requirements.286
Drawing from these cases, some characteristics of an incidental burden might make it appear more akin to regulation
than to private ordering. If an incidental burden were imposed
solely to deter otherwise-innocuous gun-related activities or to

283 Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 248 (1976). In this Article, we do not discuss the
wisdom of affirmative legislative protections such as the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act or the disparate impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See generally Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32
Cardozo L Rev 1815 (2011) (defending political protections for religious accommodations).
284 US Const Art VI, cl 2.
285 517 US 559 (1996).
286 Id at 574.
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punish gun owners specifically rather than to compensate victims, then the character of the regulation might warrant constitutional scrutiny. Consider, for example, a facially neutral noise
ordinance tailored to affect the only gun range in a municipality.
Similarly, permitting punitive damages only for reckless use of a
firearm, but not for reckless use of a vehicle, could justify the
application of constitutional scrutiny. This is not to say, of
course, that the former law would be unconstitutional—only
that it might have to satisfy Second Amendment rules.
Showing that a given law has the purpose of restricting
guns as such is not necessarily as straightforward as, for example, finding viewpoint discrimination in speech regulations.
Some scholars attribute some gun regulations to hatred of
guns287 or even to “bigotry.”288 But it seems likely that most gun
control supporters are concerned not with guns themselves but
instead with the negative consequences of their misuse. In that
sense, even direct gun control is akin not to content or viewpoint
discrimination—which can trigger First Amendment scrutiny
even when targeting otherwise-unprotected activities289—but rather to regulations targeting secondary effects.290 Reducing the
lethality of confrontations and making negligent actors compensate those whom they injure are content-neutral in this sense.
They are focused on harms, not on guns.
In the end, the question whether incidental burdens should be
subject to constitutional scrutiny simply cannot be answered using
the usual tools of doctrinal analysis. As Schauer notes with regard
to free speech, “the location of the boundaries themselves—the
threshold determination of what is a First Amendment case and

287 See, for example, Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun Control, 71 Brooklyn L Rev 715, 795 (2005) (“Some people viscerally hate guns, see no utility in them and think it is insane to talk about balancing factors
like the benefits of defensive gun use and the political value of an armed citizenry.”).
288 David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 Tenn
L Rev 417, 462 (2014).
289 See R.A.V., 505 US at 418:

It is true that loud speech in favor of the Republican Party can be regulated because it is loud, but not because it is pro-Republican; and it is true that the
public burning of the American flag can be regulated because it involves public
burning and not because it involves the flag.
For an analysis of content-neutral restrictions, see generally Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentNeutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46 (1987).
290 See City of Los Angeles v Alameda Books, Inc, 535 US 425, 432, 442 (2002) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the zoning of adult businesses on the basis that
the zoning targeted “secondary effects” rather than protected-speech activity).

2016]

What Is Gun Control?

347

what is not—is less a doctrinal matter than a political, economic,
social, and cultural one.”291 We have done our best to exhaust the
internal tools, but at some point this kind of external analysis
becomes inevitable. And it, in turn, requires some account—
thicker than we now have—of what the Second Amendment is
for. The following Part addresses that need.
III. A SECOND GENERATION OF SECOND AMENDMENT THEORY
We have identified a set of legal tools that can be used to determine whether a Second Amendment claim is cognizable. But
the tools are just that; they must be employed with some purpose in mind. In the context of the Second Amendment, that
means having a theory of what the right is all about. Whether
particular tort or property rules are enshrined in the text and
history of the Second Amendment depends on what principles
and values underlie the Amendment itself. What kinds of burdens are significant varies depending on whether one sees the
Second Amendment as concerned with self-defense against
crime or against the government.
Again, these are boundary questions—issues of coverage rather than of protection. The point is not simply that Second
Amendment ideology shapes people’s ideas of permissible gun
control. Rather, one’s theory of the Second Amendment also determines what one sees as gun control in the first place. Whether a negligence action for failure to safely store a firearm is a
background norm that the Second Amendment does not cover, or
a regulation that it does, depends on what you think the
Amendment is all about.
The answer to this underlying question cannot be found in
Heller or McDonald. In somewhat-simplified and oftenmisunderstood terms, those cases hold that the Amendment protects an “individual” right to keep and bear arms, whose “core”
and “central component” is “self-defense.”292 Critics and supporters alike have read these cases as ending the doctrinal debate
over what the Second Amendment is really about.293 But although
the Court has taken some arguments off the table—for example,

291

Schauer, 117 Harv L Rev at 1765 (cited in note 1).
Heller, 554 US at 599, 630 (emphasis omitted). See also McDonald, 561 US at 767.
293 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It
Says (Wall St J, June 27, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/S5DL-FPHA.
292
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those that are premised solely on militia service294—it has also
generated demand for a new generation of Second Amendment
theory. At least three different accounts seem plausible, all of
which are consistent with a self-defense core.
Although we believe that determining the Second Amendment’s boundaries requires some account of its purpose or value,
we do not suppose that the judges answering these questions
will necessarily adopt a comprehensive theory of the Second
Amendment. Most judges are likely to continue deciding Second
Amendment cases with a healthy dose of pragmatism and intuition. Our goal is to try to discern some pattern to these decisions, relate them to existing and future questions, and explain
the whole in a more transparent and integrated way. Whether
the resulting categories are called approaches, theories, values,
or principles is of no real significance.
Nor do we suppose that a single account of the Second
Amendment will command unanimous support, any more than
agreement has emerged regarding a theory of free speech or
equal protection. But skepticism about theoretical consensus is
no reason to leave the theory unarticulated or unexamined. Our
goal here is modest: to articulate three plausible Second
Amendment values and to briefly identify their weaknesses and
strengths.
A.

Autonomy

As with free speech, the right to keep and bear arms could
have some kind of intrinsic value—one that is rooted in an individual right to personal autonomy.295 This view resonates with
the strongly libertarian flavor of much gun-rights rhetoric.
A person who subscribes to this autonomy view of the Second Amendment is primarily concerned with the liberty of selfreliance, not with instrumental ends like preventing tyranny or
even promoting personal safety. This person will not be satisfied
with the proposition that gun control would make him safer
(even assuming that he believes such a thing), just as it would
be unsatisfying for him to say that another person’s speech can
294 Heller, 554 US at 593 (“[The right to keep and bear arms] was clearly an individual right, having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia.”).
295 See Green, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 154 (cited in note 37); Robert Weisberg, Book
Review, The Utilitarian and Deontological Entanglement of Debating Guns, Crime, and
Punishment in America, 71 U Chi L Rev 333, 337 (2004) (identifying the “association of
the gun with a form of individual autonomy”).
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be silenced so long as his ideas are expressed or that a person’s
vote can be taken so long as his political positions are represented. Weaker forms of this autonomy rationale make suspect incidental common-law rules like a duty to retreat296 or a duty to
submit to an unlawful arrest.297 The strongest form of the autonomy theory is completely unconcerned with any collateral effect
created by the possession of a firearm. In this strong version, a
blind person has as much of a right to a firearm as a sighted
person.298
With regard to incidental burdens on gun rights, the hardest questions for the autonomy theory are also the most inevitable: what to do when one individual’s choice conflicts with another individual’s right—as, for example, when a store owner
seeks to exclude a gun carrier. On the one hand, the gun owner’s
autonomous right to keep and bear arms is threatened, which
suggests that the Second Amendment might be put into play to
defend it. On the other hand, doing so would threaten the store
owner’s autonomous right to determine whether guns on his
property further or threaten his self-defense interests, irrespective of any data showing that the store owner may be safer by
allowing the gun owners to enter the store.299 This is not a tension that can be resolved from within the Second Amendment—
it requires recourse to broader considerations of ethics and political theory.
One of the central complications with an autonomy view of
the Second Amendment is that—like autonomy approaches to
the First Amendment—it may be overexpansive. If people can
assert Second Amendment claims against incidental burdens
based simply on the fact that they consider gun ownership to be
important to their identities, then extending constitutional coverage seems more like the granting of an unfair subsidy. This
was one of the concerns underlying Smith. In that case, the petitioner argued that the use of peyote was part of his religious
practice and that denying him unemployment benefits based on
296 See, for example, State v Johnson, 152 NW2d 529, 532 (Minn 1967) (identifying
one element of self-defense as “the duty of the slayer to retreat or avoid the danger if
reasonably possible”). See also Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second
Amendment, 86 Ind L J 939, 942 n 24 (2011) (noting that law-enforcement officers generally do not have a duty to retreat).
297 See Miller, 86 Ind L J at 941–42 (cited in note 296).
298 See William Kremer, Guide Dogs and Guns: America’s Blind Gunmen (BBC, Aug
13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Z57H-D5AX.
299 See Blocher, 64 Stan L Rev at 42 (cited in note 113).
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his drug use therefore violated the Free Exercise Clause.300 The
Court disagreed: “To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”301 The
majority concluded that “neutral law[s] of general applicability”
should be subject to only rational basis review, even when they
have the impact of regulating religiously motivated activity.302
The analogy to gun rights is not hard to see. If the Second
Amendment immunized individuals from generally applicable
laws like trespass, nuisance, and assault based on their autonomy interests, then it would essentially permit each person’s
“belief” about armed self-defense to be “superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself.”303 But it cannot be the case that a person’s sincere fear
gives him the right to keep whatever arms make him feel secure
and to bear them whenever he feels insecure. That is not how
self-defense law works,304 and it would be surprising if it became
part of a constitutional right predicated on self-defense.
B.

Democracy

A second way to understand the Second Amendment is as a
bulwark of democracy, guaranteeing the means of self-defense
against a potentially tyrannical government. Though the popular
view (and legal concept) of self-defense tends to focus on its relationship to personal safety against other private citizens, some
gun-rights advocates instead focus—even after Heller—on the
role of guns in preventing government tyranny.305 This approach

300

Smith, 494 US at 874–75.
Id at 879, citing Reynolds v United States, 98 US (8 Otto) 145, 166–67 (1878). See
also Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L Rev 245, 248 (1991) (arguing that “Smith rightly jettisoned the conduct exemption because it is manifestly contrary to the plain meaning of the Free Exercise Clause”).
302 Smith, 494 US at 879, 885–89.
303 Id at 879.
304 See, for example, United States v Acosta-Sierra, 690 F3d 1111, 1119–20 (9th Cir
2012) (noting that a victim’s apprehension of immediate bodily injury must be determined by an “objective standard of reasonableness”).
305 See, for example, Joshua Horwitz and Casey Anderson, Taking Gun Rights Seriously: The Insurrectionist Idea and Its Consequences, 1 Albany Govt L Rev 496, 497 (2008):
301

Distrust of—and outright hostility toward—government power has become a cornerstone of gun rights advocacy, and leading gun rights organizations routinely
urge their members to prepare to resist their government with force of arms. Recent public opinion research shows that many gun owners have accepted this
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is roughly analogous to free speech theories that are based on
the role of speech in preserving or constituting democracy.
This view, too, has important implications for what kinds of
gun regulations are cognizable. Rather than personal safety or
autonomy, the underlying value in the democracy theory of the
Second Amendment is the prevention of governmental tyranny—rules that threaten this checking value are most likely to be
seen as problematic. With regard to incidental burdens in particular, believers in the antityranny, self-defense-againstgovernment view of the Second Amendment are likely to be particularly sensitive to the state-action requirement—when the
government is acting, they might say, the danger of tyranny is
ever present.
Even assuming that the state-action requirement is satisfied, however, hard questions remain about whether to subject
incidental burdens to constitutional review. For a believer in the
antityranny view, structural concerns—especially those that focus on the role of limited federal power—are primary. But it is
not immediately obvious which way those concerns should point.
On the one hand, any obvious state action—a statute or
regulation, for example—may raise fears of tyranny, notwithstanding the incidental nature of the burden imposed. Some
supporters of broad gun rights argue that the Amendment itself
was enacted in large part because of incidental burdens on gun
carrying. It is common, for example, to argue that supposedly
neutral regulations of general applicability like the English
game laws and rules against affray and disturbing the peace
were used to eviscerate the freedom of people to keep and bear
arms. If that is so, then the very purpose of the right might have
been to protect against such incidental burdens.
In other cases, however, subjecting incidental burdens—
especially those arising from private rights of action—to constitutional scrutiny can mean interjecting the government (courts,
specifically) into most cases of private ordering. If, for example,
trespass actions by homeowners against gun carriers can give rise
to Second Amendment claims, then judges will be in the position
of exercising government authority against private parties. That

message . . . and see resistance to government as a compelling reason for owning
a gun and opposing efforts to regulate the private ownership of firearms.
(citation omitted).
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can raise fears of tyranny just as surely as direct government
regulation will.
C.

Personal Safety

Perhaps the best-known theory of free speech is the marketplace of ideas metaphor attributed to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes: that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”306 Speech
must be free to enable this competition, which is more likely
than state-imposed orthodoxy to lead to truth, knowledge, and
other good results. As Justice Louis Brandeis put it in his own
statement of the marketplace rationale, “[F]reedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth.”307
An analogous theory—which could be called the “marketplace of violence,” though its persuasiveness does not depend on
the strength of the analogy—seems to motivate a great deal of
thinking about guns and gun control. On this theory, the state
does not possess a monopoly on violence.308 The individual possesses an inalienable right to threaten violence through the
keeping and bearing of arms, which contributes to personal safety in roughly the same way that speech contributes to truth.
Some acts of violence—like some ideas—will be undesirable, but
they will be deterred or stopped by desirable acts of violence,
such as those involving justified self-defense. As with speech,
desirable exercises of the right (those that advance self-defense
or truth) will win out over undesirable activities (those that
306 Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting). See also
John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing 45 (MacMillan
1959) (H.B. Cotterill, ed) (originally published 1644) (“Let her and falsehood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”).
307 Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis concurring).
308 See Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun Control
Legislation, 58 Mont L Rev 79, 99 (1997) (arguing that modern law assumes “that the responsibility for keeping peace has passed from the individual to the state and that the use
of force to keep the peace is effectively a state monopoly,” and further arguing that “[t]his
modern view differs markedly from eighteenth century views”); George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U Pitt L Rev 553, 570 (1996) (“Individuals do not cede a total monopoly of force to the state. They reserve the right when
danger is imminent and otherwise unavoidable to secure their own safety against aggression.”); David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups,
and the Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 Tulane L Rev 387, 459
(1999) (characterizing a common belief among progun minority groups and women that
“[t]he state must have no monopoly of violence, either because it threatens hate violence
itself or because it tolerates such violence by private parties”).
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promote safety threats or falsehoods).309 In both instances, the
marketplace metaphor rests on a confident and optimistic vision
of the world. Indeed, there is a striking similarity between
Brandeis’s conclusion that (with important limitations) when
falsehood arises “the remedy to be applied is more speech”310 and
the NRA’s argument that “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy
with a gun is a good guy with a gun.”311
As with the marketplace of ideas, there might be at least
three grounds for opposing government efforts to regulate the
marketplace of violence: epistemic distrust, inequality, and fear
of corruption. Epistemic objections are true marketplace arguments: the government is simply incapable of generating optimal safety through gun regulation, and the invisible hand of the
market will provide better (that is, safer) results.312 Equality objections are inflected with autonomy rationales: even if the government could design a regime for optimal safety, it is inequitable for the government to elevate the self-defense interests of,
say, armored car drivers over school bus drivers. Finally, corruption arguments are inflected with democracy rationales: the
government should not be able to regulate firearms, because it
will always do so in a way that protects insiders.
In the context of the Second Amendment, market theories
operate similarly with regard to personal safety. For epistemic
market advocates, laws that regulate guns in the name of personal safety should be subject to heightened scrutiny precisely
because personal safety is best achieved through broad gun
ownership.313 For equality advocates, the government must show
why burdens on eighteen-year-olds are justified compared to
burdens on twenty-one-year-olds, or how regulating knives differently from pistols does not impermissibly harm those who
prefer to protect themselves with blades rather than with bullets. For objections based on corruption, the government’s desire
309

See, for example, Miller, 86 NYU L Rev at 946 (cited in note 126).
Whitney, 274 US at 377 (Brandeis concurring) (“If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
311 Eric Lichtblau and Motoko Rich, N.R.A. Envisions ‘a Good Guy with a Gun’ in
Every School (NY Times, Dec 21, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/XXE2-NKWF (quoting NRA Executive Vice President LaPierre).
312 See generally, for example, John R. Lott Jr, More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-Control Laws (Chicago 1998).
313 See Green, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 146 (cited in note 37) (identifying one theory
of the Second Amendment as “constitutionaliz[ing] the empirical judgment that private
arms possession promotes public safety”).
310
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to empower its own agents—say, the police or the National
Guard—over others is a cause for constitutional concern.
Although the marketplace-of-violence model is descriptively
and rhetorically powerful, there are important distinctions between the application of marketplace logic in the contexts of
speech and guns. Those distinctions might render one or the
other more normatively desirable or analytically useful. Many
people undoubtedly perceive the stakes to be higher—or at least
more immediate—in the context of guns and personal violence
than speech.314 Even justified acts of self-defense generally are
seen as a regrettable necessity, not as the same kind of unalloyed benefit as a “good” idea. Moreover, the actual competition
between ideas imposes relatively few costs and may even be a
benefit (the lifeblood of public discourse, after all, is exactly this
kind of competition). By contrast, the competition between
guns—even from the perspective of those who believe in strong
gun rights—is more of a necessary evil than a positive good. Indeed, from one perspective, the marketplace of violence could be
nothing less than a failure of one of the central purposes of the
state—preventing prisoner’s dilemmas by claiming a monopoly
on the legitimate use of violence.315
Heller and McDonald represent a bookend to the first generation of Second Amendment theorizing, which focused on
whether the Amendment is limited to militias. But they also set
the stage for another round of theoretical debate. The task now
is to flesh out, as scholars have done for generations with the
First Amendment, what the new Second Amendment right is really about. As we have tried to show here, the scope of permissible gun regulation—whether or not it is labeled as such—
depends on the answer.
CONCLUSION
Justice Owen Roberts famously provided a draftsman’s model
of judicial review: all a judge must do is lay the Constitution
314 Of course, some might argue to the contrary that free speech is the single most
important value in a well-functioning democracy.
315 See Green, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 152 (cited in note 37). Professor Michael
Steven Green argues that the more-guns theory leads to an arms race—a classic prisoner’s dilemma—and that “a primary purpose of a government’s authority is overcoming
prisoner’s dilemmas.” Id. See also Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in David Owen and
Tracy B. Strong, eds, The Vocation Lectures 32, 33 (Hackett 2004) (Rodney Livingstone,
trans) (“[T]he state is the form of human community that [ ] lays claim to the monopoly
of legitimate physical violence.”) (emphasis omitted).
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beside the law and “decide whether the latter squares with the
former.”316 But as the pressure of Second Amendment litigation
increases, the most difficult and consequential choice for judges
will be not about squaring constitutional proportions but about
whether to pick up the Constitution in the first place. We have
described various tools that judges and others can use, as well
as theories that they will need, to perform that increasingly essential task.

316

United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 62 (1936).

